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I. INTRODUCTION, OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGY
Family relationships are both a source of profound satisfaction, and a source of
profound challenges for Ontarians. All family relationships end eventually, and it is not
always death which does them part. At least 40% of intimate relationships between
adults are eventually terminated by the choice of one or both parties. 1 Some intimate
relationships dissolve painlessly. Many others, however, create serious challenges
when they end, both for the individuals involved and for Ontario as a whole. From the
province’s point of view, these family challenges can be analogized to a public health
problem. The malady in question is not generally fatal, but it is certainly widespread. 2
This paper considers first the problem, then the prevention, and finally the
treatment. In so doing, it deploys cost-benefit and economic lenses as analytical tools.
This paper has been prepared for the family law procedure project currently being
conducted by the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO). The LCO’s work will also draw
together research on interdisciplinarity in the legal profession and the results of a broad
public consultation with Ontarians. This paper will refer to the findings from these
consultations, and seek to relate them to the existing scholarly literature. This paper
also includes tentative reform recommendations where they seem to be justified by the
research. 3
Part I of this paper defines the phrase “family challenges” and introduces costbenefit analysis, with a focus on its potential and its limitations within this field of inquiry.
Part II identifies three sources of family challenges: (i) the economic vulnerability of
Canadian families, (ii) sacrifices in earning potential during family life, and (iii) conflict
arising upon relationship breakdown. Part III turns to mechanisms by which the
province might prevent family challenges, either by preventing relationship breakdown
3

or by preventing the challenges which arise upon breakdown. In Part IV, the paper
turns to government responses to family challenges. Section IV.A is about increasing
the legal information and services, and identifying the costs and benefits of alternative
dispute resolution and litigation. Section IV.B analyzes the potential of administrative,
state-driven responses to family challenges. Part V offers a brief conclusion.

I. A. Subject Matter: the Families and the Challenges Under Examination
Here
Sociologists, psychologists, and public policy experts have all proposed
definitions of the word “family.” 4 “Family law,” as the subject is taught in Canadian law
schools and classified in case digests, may include issues such as child protection and
assisted reproduction law. This paper, however, focuses on families which involve
intimate or “conjugal” relationships between adults. This includes same-sex and nonmarital relationships and relationships which do not produce children. The focus of this
paper is the challenges faced by these families and their individual members after the
adult cohabitation ceases. However the roots of these post-cohabitation challenges
must be traced to the experience of the family members during cohabitation.
This paper encompasses neither families which never involved an intimate
relationship between adults, nor families in which the intimate inter-adult relationship
never dissolved. The rationale for this limitation of scope is that there is a distinct set of
challenges posed by the dissolution of intimate relationships between adults. These
challenges are those discussed in sections II.B and II.C – sacrifices in earning potential
and interpersonal conflict arising on relationship breakdown. Other families -- the family
involved in a child protection proceeding, the family seeking access to artificial
reproduction technologies, the single parent seeking to support an adopted child -- face
4

a distinct set of challenges. Because the time and space available do not permit a
thorough treatment of this second set of challenges, they must be left for another paper.

I. B. Unit of Analysis: Individual or Family?
This paper will consider the welfare and interests of Ontarians who were
members of families, while seeking to simultaneously keep in view the interests of
families as units. Our family law and our dispute resolution system currently focus on
the individual rights and obligations of family members. To some extent, this is an
inevitable consequence of our law’s aspiration to protect the interests of (i) people who
no longer wish to cohabit, and (ii) individuals whose intimate relationships have been
terminated by the other party. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has
arguably helped entrench the individualism of Canadian family law. 5
However, it is also possible to think creatively about protecting the interests of
family units, even when those families appear to be disintegrating. At least if children
are present, dispute resolution can be conceived not as the end of a family but rather as
a reconfiguration of a family. 6 The law aspires to preserve a child’s relationships with
both parents in most cases. 7 Therefore, parents often do not or can not entirely
disentangle their lives for as long as their child or children remain below the age of
majority. This may require family law process to consider the emotional health of the
parents, and the need to support a modified, post-cohabitation “family.” 8 Doing so can
make the adults into better parents, which supports the law’s overriding goal in
parenting litigation of upholding the best interests of the child. 9
There is some precedent in the literature for a focus on families as units. There
is also an ongoing popular and scholarly debate about whether or marriage is itself “in
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decline.” 10 The focus of interest in this debate is not so much the well-being of the
individuals within families as it is the well-being of the families as units. The case for
triage or differentiated case management is largely based on the idea that different
families (as opposed to different individuals) are best served by different services and
dispute-resolution approaches. 11 The costs and benefits of focusing on family units
versus individuals awaits a fuller exploration, but the literature does provide a basis to
explore this intriguing possibility. The interests of broader communities and of Ontario
as a whole may be correlated with a progressive and therapeutic response to family
units in crisis. This paper will, whenever possible, seek to incorporate both the
individual and the family as units of analysis.

I. C. The role of choice in the formation of family
Different scholarly perspectives have come to different conclusions about the role
of choice within the formation of the family. To some extent, intimate conjugal
relationships may be understood as voluntary, contractual arrangements established by
consenting adults for mutual benefit. The mutual benefit is psychological but also
financial, insofar as cohabiting and sharing expenses can raise the material standard of
living for both parties.
Alternatively, these relationships may be sites of coercion and power. 12 Meg
Luxton, for example, suggests that
women’s primary responsibility for domestic labour, and particularly
childcare and other caregiving responsibilities, is central to women’s
economic dependency on men … the nuclear family form results in
women doing vast amounts of socially necessary labour for free and in
ways that are not recognized or validated socially. 13
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Choice is also a central issue in the debate about distinctions between
cohabitation and marriage. Some scholars argue that the law should not make
distinctions between couples who have cohabited for extended periods and couples
who married. 14 Others reply that the choice to marry or not marry is a significant one,
from which private family law consequences may legitimately follow. 15 Another line of
critical inquiry focuses on the concept of “conjugality,” and queries whether the law
should distinguish between those whose cohabitation is “conjugal” and those whose
cohabitation is not. 16
Marriage itself and its historical development have been widely explored in the
sociological literature. Ernest Burgess argued in 1945 that, near the beginning of the
20th century, a transformation had occurred in the United States from “institutional
marriage” to “companionate marriage.” 17 Whereas the former type of marriage was a
“building block of society” and regulated by social norms, the latter was fundamentally
defined by the affective bonds between the parties and by their choice of each other.
John Amato and his colleagues have suggested that this trend continued into the postwar period:
As men and women gained greater freedom to engage in multiple
sexual relationships before marriage, marry whomever they pleased,
negotiate their own marital roles, and leave unsatisfactory unions,
people came to focus increasingly on whether potential spouses would
be good companions, emotionally supportive mates, and satisfying
sexual partners. 18

This development appears to have elevated the importance of individual choice
in the formation intimate relationships. Andrew Cherlin argued in 2004 that a second
transformation had subsequently occurred, towards “individualized marriage, in which
the emphasis on personal choice and self-development expanded.” 19 Amato et al
7

suggested in their 2007 book that “we may be witnessing a shift toward a new view of
marriage that values the institutional basis of marriage but also recognizes the
importance of companionate and individualistic elements – a form of marriage in which
individual happiness and obligations to the larger society are in balance.” 20
In a diverse and multicultural jurisdiction like Ontario, it is likely that the nature of
intimate relationships, and the extent to which they are the products of choice or
coercion, are highly dependent on the values and cultural background which the parties
bring into them. Kerry Daly’s comments about “parenting culture” might be equally
applicable to the influence of culture on decisions about family relationships generally:
Culture consists of an ever changing constellation of meanings and
practices, that provides a means for examining the flow of family
experience within context … In our everyday lived experience, culture is
usually hidden from view, because it is so familiar and so deeply
embedded in our habits and routines. For parents, this often means that
the everyday decisions of parenting are shaped by non-specific,
background undercurrents that guide what seems right, natural or
appropriate. Culture is paradoxical insofar as it is pervasive in
everything we do but so often it is indecipherable. It is a case of the fish
not being able to see the water in which it swims. 21

To the extent that intimate relationships are the product of choices, to what
extent are they economic choices? It is generally thought that decision-making in
intimate relationships and between family models is driven by emotional or cultural
factors, rather than economic ones. However, studies of the decision whether to marry
have identified relevant economic incentives and disincentives to marriage. 22 Premarital and cohabitation contracts are entered into by at least some Canadians, and
those who do so are clearly aware of the economic consequences of intimate
relationships and their potential breakdown. 23
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I. D. Evaluative Tool: Cost-Benefit Analysis
This paper will seek to apply cost-benefit analytical tools to family challenges and
our responses to them. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been defined as the
Attemp[t] to place a dollar valuation on the outcomes of a program or
intervention and to answer the question: How much is society willing to
pay for the output of this program or what are the benefits to society of
having this output? The dollar valuation of this output or the benefits are
then compared with the costs of producing it. If the benefits exceed the
costs, the program is considered to be an efficient use of society's
resources. 24

CBA originally sought to identify “Pareto improvements,” which is to say changes
in policy which would make at least one person better off without making anyone worse
off. 25 Following the work of Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, CBA came to accept that a
change can be described as “efficient” even if someone is made worse off, provided that
everyone would be better off if the “winners” from the change were to compensate the
“losers.” 26 CBA has been widely applied to the study of environmental and other
regulation 27 and to proposals for new government expenditure, for example in health
care. 28 However, it has also been criticized for inattentiveness to distributional
questions and for its attempt to put a dollar value on human life or other things which
should arguably be considered “priceless.” 29
Formal cost-benefit analysis generally requires (i) a quantification of benefits and
costs and (ii) an arithmetic comparison of them. Often many of the numbers in the
equation are speculative, insofar as they refer to an uncertain future or contra-factual
situations. 30 Even if they are real and have already been incurred, determining the true
costs and benefits of public sector initiatives is very challenging. Regarding costs, the
theoretical efforts of Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Office and its counterparts are
helpful. 31 With regard to social benefits, the work of the Commission on the
9

Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress led by economist Joseph
Stiglitz is also useful. 32
Assuming that costs and benefits can be quantified, cost-benefit analysis may be
used to identify investments of public funds which will “pay for themselves” or produce
benefits which exceed their costs in the long run. For example, a recent report from the
Ontario Association of Food Banks argued that poverty costs $10.4 billion to $13.1
billion per year for the federal and provincial governments, or $2,299 to $2,895 per year
per Ontarian household. 33 This report divides the social cost of poverty into three
components. The "remedial costs" include governmental health care, crime-response,
and social assistance expenditures which would not exist in the absence of poverty.
The "intergenerational costs" are created by the inherited impediments and needs of
children of poor families. "Opportunity costs" are the provincial revenues which are lost
because of citizens being less economically productive than they would be in the
absence of poverty. 34
Cost-benefit analysis is compatible with a variety of different choices about
what’s important to us as a society. In the words of Cass Sunstein, CBA
should not be seen as embodying a reductionist account of the good,
and much less as a suggestion that everything is simply a “commodity”
for human use. It is best taken as pragmatic instrument, agnostic on the
deep issues and designed to assist people in making complex
judgments where multiple goods are involved. 35

CBA requires, and is not an alternative to, a conversation about our values as a society.
This conversation is necessary in order to place dollar figures on the various outcomes
of public policy options. As an analytical technique, CBA is compatible with a variety of
alternative schemes for valuing these outcomes, such as the Genuine Progress Index
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(GPI). The GPI is an index of human progress which was designed as an alternative to
more purely financial measures such as Gross Domestic Product or Gross National
Product. 36 Formulations of the GPI often include items such as “cost of family
breakdown” and “value of non-paid household labour” which are directly relevant to any
application of CBA to family policy issues. 37

I.D.1. Applying CBA Methodology to Family Challenges: Limitations
The methodological difficulty of quantifying speculative costs is particularly biting
in the field of study under examination here. For example, a true cost-benefit analysis of
the parent education program in Toronto’s Superior Court might have to determine how
much further litigation would currently be occurring had the program never been put into
place. The long-term impact of different procedures and interventions upon children is
also little understood, largely due to the ethical challenges of scientifically controlled
research on children. 38
Assessing costs of family dispute resolution for the participants also requires
looking outside of family law itself. An example of this approach is Walking on
Eggshells: Abused Women's Experiences of Ontario's Welfare System, a report
prepared by a multidisciplinary team in 2004. 39 This report identified a nexus between
family law disputes, social assistance, and domestic violence. Ontario Works (the
provincial social assistance system) is a means-tested program. In order to be entitled,
an applicant must show that he or she remains below a certain income level despite
having made “reasonable efforts to obtain compensation or realize” all “financial
resource[s] or income that the person may be entitled to or eligible for.” 40 An applicant
who is entitled to child support from a co-parent must therefore make efforts to obtain it.
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If the applicant has experienced domestic violence at the hands of this co-parent, then
the obligation to pursue him or her for child support may create vulnerability to further
violence. The Ontario Works Policy Directives respond to this danger by providing that
“individuals at risk of domestic violence are not expected to pursue support and may be
granted a waiver.” 41 However, the Walking on Eggshells authors reported that many
individuals who would have benefitted from this waiver were unaware of it. Within their
interview sample, only 2 out of 34 claimants who might have qualified for the waiver
were even aware of its existence. 42 One interviewee reported:
I was told absolutely, that I had to go for child support even though I told
them that it was a dangerous situation, they still said I had to do it if I
wanted to receive benefits from them. And then they turned right around
and said they were going to take it. 43

While this specific account cannot be corroborated, it is probably representative of the
experience of at least some domestic violence victims. The pressure to pursue child
support faced by social assistance recipients is an example of a “cost” imposed by our
family service delivery system and borne by an already vulnerable group. However, it is
very difficult to imagine how this cost might be quantified.
As discussed below, there is a substantial literature evaluating experiments and
pilot projects in the family dispute resolution sphere. The value of these projects is most
often measured in terms of the settlement rate – how many of the litigants withdrew
from litigation after engaging in the initiative under study. Settlement rates are a helpful
indicator proxy for the benefits of a family process reform initiative, but a settlement
might be exploitative or not durable. For this reason follow-up interviews and
questionnaires with participants, asking for example how many would recommend a
particular intervention, are a useful complement to settlement rates. 44
12

These studies provide a basis for comparing the costs of specific types of ADR
to the process costs of litigation, but they do not generally consider broader costs and
benefits (including non-financial ones) to adults, to children, and to communities.
Identifying these costs and benefits would be necessary in order to perform a formal
CBA. The evaluation of Australia’s 2006 reforms conducted by Rae Kaspiew and her
colleagues is extremely comprehensive and exceeds 400 pages in length, but even this
thorough document is not able to perform a formal and quantified cost-benefit
analysis. 45
More broadly, it is not clear that one can ever quantify the value of intangibles
such as preserving access to justice, 46 cultivating forgiveness between the parties, 47 or
other costs and benefits offered by litigation and alternative responses to family
challenges. Nonetheless the literature has recognized that such items have a value
which can be weighed against other values. For example, the conclusion of McIntosh et
al regarding Australia’s “Children’s Cases Program” pilot project was that “a loss in
apparent judicial impartiality amounted to a clear gain for many parents, who were more
often reached, moved, and inspired by a judge who entered their struggle.” 48

I.D.2. Applying CBA to Family Challenges: Potential
Cost-benefit analysis in its formal and technical version has not often been
applied to family law policy questions. 49 However, there are a few interesting examples
of less structured applications of similar, economically-oriented analytical tools to family
challenges. A 2009 submission to Ontario’s Attorney General argued for the funding of
“Case Assessment Coordinators” and expanded mediation services in Ontario courts. 50
This argument was supported by an Appendix identifying the various cost components
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of implementing this proposal at one court. The Appendix also identified the cost of the
proposal per case diverted from court. 51
Even when the quantification required by formal CBA is impossible, costs and
benefits are identified in a less technical way in family law policy debates. “Informal”
CBA might simply mean focusing on costs and benefits of alternative responses to
family challenges and using this thought process to generate reform ideas. An example
is found in the debate about whether the law should encourage more “equal” divisions
of parenting time after a relationship ends. It is a generally acknowledged benefit to
children to have parenting arrangements which preserve meaningful relationships with
both of their parents. 52 However, inter-parental conflict is a generally acknowledged
cost or detriment to children, especially if the children are aware of or observe that
conflict. 53 The effort to preserve relationships with both parents by ordering joint
custody may often increase the level of conflict. Substantial debate continues about how
to balance the benefit against the cost. Scholars question whether reforms to
strengthen children’s relationships with both parents post-separation (benefit) would
increase conflict (cost) to the extent that there is a net detriment for the children. 54

II. FAMILY CHALLENGES
The challenges which Ontarians experience after family separation often have
roots within the economic life of the intact family. Ontario’s families are highly
vulnerable to the economic challenges of relationship breakdown, due to low levels of
savings and high household expenses relative to household income. Individuals who
have curtailed labour force participation in order to assume domestic responsibilities
within a family face unique challenges if that family dissolves. Whatever economic
14

arrangements prevail within the intact family, some degree of conflict often
accompanies the end of a relationship, and this is another major source of family
challenges.
A recent case report tells the story of an Ontario couple who experienced many
typical family challenges. 55 The story of their relationship and its dissolution is told
below. Subsequent sections of this paper will make reference to this story, in order to
illustrate the nature and impact of family challenges.
Ronald Peters and Beatrice Smith met in 1974, when both were
employed by the federal government. Beatrice was 18 years old at the
time; Ron was 27 and had two children from a previous relationship.
Three years later, Ron and Beatrice moved in together and began living
as a couple. For the next 11 years, they lived together in various
Canadian towns to which Ron was posted by the Canadian government.
In 1988, they got married. Ron soon received a promotion, becoming
manager of workplace a small Ontario town.
Beatrice was still working in another office of the same federal
ministry at the time. She fell afoul of the criminal law after taking
financial advantage of her employer. She was convicted and
incarcerated for theft, fraud, and forgery. Although this development
had an impact on both parties, their relationship survived the blow. In
1995 Ron and Beatrice moved south, to a larger city. They opened a
small print and copy shop.
When they arrived in their new city, Beatrice was 40 years old and
Ron was close to 50. They had lived together for 18 years. Although
Beatrice’s criminal charge was still hanging over them unresolved, they
established themselves in a new city and were probably optimistic about
becoming entrepreneurs. They also had another reason for joy –
Beatrice was pregnant with their first daughter, Sarah. Sarah was born
on Canada Day 1995. Her sister followed almost exactly three years to
the day later -- June 30, 1998.
Ron and Beatrice devised a schedule to allow them to care for their
infant daughters and their infant business at the same time. Ron, who
left the federal workforce after moving, cared for the babies from
Monday to Friday while Beatrice staffed the business. On the weekend,
they would switch roles; with Beatrice at home and Ron dealing with the
business. Despite these diligent efforts, the store was never very
successful. In 2006, a judge found that it was losing over $10,000 per
year, and it subsequently became bankrupt.
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In June 2005, Beatrice suddenly moved out of the parties’ home.
She apparently did so without any warning or prior announcement.
However, she must have had her reasons for ending a 30 year
relationship.
Despite -- or perhaps because of -- their many decades together and
their two young children, the parties were unable to part company
amicably. It may be that they had never been very happy; a judge later
found an “undercurrent in the evidence of some domestic violence
between the parties and a power imbalance in the relationship of the
parties.” 56 When Beatrice left the matrimonial home in June of 2005,
she took the children with her to a location which she did not disclose to
Ron. Ron did not find out where they were living until the following
January. He had no formal access to his daughters until one year after
the separation. At that time, weekly supervised access visits of one
hour in duration began.
Infuriated, Ron responded by creating a series of internet sites and
conducting a public campaign against what he alleged were Beatrice’s
efforts to alienate the children from him. He wrote a letter denouncing
Beatrice to the principal of the girls’ school, and also created and
distributed “press releases” about her and about the parties’ dispute.
The Office of the Children’s Lawyer became involved in the case in
2006, and a social worker from that agency prepared a report which was
used at trial. A social worker from the local Children’s Aid Society was
also active in the case. A six-day trial occurred in late summer 2009, at
which neither party had the benefit of a lawyer. Beatrice did not even
formally testify, although she did present her case to the court and had
witnesses speak for her. The central issues in the trial were the parental
alienation allegation, child custody, child support, and division of family
property.

II. A. Economic Vulnerability of Canadian Families
The Peters are somewhat indicative of this economic vulnerability of Canadian
families , although they were perhaps better off than most. Ron Peters was fortunate, to
have a secure pension from the Government of Canada paying $48,306 per year. 57
Beatrice’s income was not disclosed by the case report. However, the parties worked
for ten years to build a business which appears to have consistently lost money and
eventually gone bankrupt. At the time of the judgment, Ron owed over $50,000 to the
Canada Revenue Agency and Beatrice owed $26,000 to a credit counselling agency.
After 30 years of hard work, their collective net worth was less than $300,000. 58
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The end of an intimate cohabitational relationship is a time of financial stress for
its members. At the very least, cohabitation’s economies of scale are suddenly lost and
transitional costs of establishing new domiciles must be absorbed. Subsequent
sections of this document will describe in detail the financial costs of relationship
breakdown and family litigation. The ability of individuals to meet these challenges
depends substantially on their economic position before the break-up occurred, and
there is evidence that large numbers of Canadian families are already “on the edge”
financially and ill-equipped to deal with relationship breakdown. There is also evidence
that the poorest Ontarians (those earning less than $20,000 per year) are 33% more
likely than other Ontarians to experience family relationship problems. 59
Canadians have become steadily more indebted and less likely to have savings,
and this trend has persisted through economic recessions, recoveries, and booms. This
trend has reduced the ability of Canadians to draw upon reserves of cash and property
in order to cushion the financial blow of relationship breakdown. 60 The following chart,
adapted from a recent Vanier Institute report authored by Roger Sauvé, illustrates the
steadily increase over time in average debt per household. 61
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Figure 1: Average Canadian Household Debt in Constant 2007 Dollars

One indicator of the capacity of Canadian households to “carry” this increasing debt is
the ratio of household debt to income. This measure reached a new record of 145% in
December of 2009. 62
Turning from net wealth to household income, we find that many Canadian
families are “just getting by.” A key driver of increasing debt loads is the decreasing
ability or willingness of the average household to save. The average annual savings of
Canadian households decreased from $7,700 in 1990 to $2,800 in 2000, although it
recovered by 14% between 2000 and 2010. 63 In the third quarter of 2009, the average
Canadian household earned $66,200 and spent $63,000. 64 The Canadian Payroll
Association, reporting on a survey conducted in September of 2009, found that “59% of
Canadian employees report they would have trouble making ends meet if their
paycheque was delayed by even one week.” 65 Given these financial realities, it is easy
to see how the sudden and dramatic costs of relationship breakdown – such as legal
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fees and finding new housing – can be disastrous for Ontario’s families and their
members.

II. B. Sacrifices in Earning Potential Undertaken in Intact Families
As noted above, intriguing scholarly debates surround the role of economic and
other choices in family formation. Economic choices remain highly significant within the
life of an intact family. If an individual chooses (or is coerced into) making sacrifices in
earning potential while cohabiting in an intact family, those sacrifices give rise to
financial difficulties after the relationship dissolves. Family responsibilities often lead
Ontarians to make such sacrifices, and this is therefore a post-relationship challenge
which has roots within the economic life of the intact family. This section will discuss the
nature of individual earning-potential sacrifices, the persistent gender pattern in this
phenomenon, and the post-relationship impact of earning-potential sacrifices.

II. B. 1. How Family Life can Lead to Sacrifices in Individual Earning Potential
Sacrifices in earning potential typically take the form of an individual’s (i) choices
to reduce participation in educational or training programs which would increase an
individual’s earning potential; (ii) choices to voluntarily depart from the workforce,
temporarily or permanently; or (iii) choices about where, how, and how much to work
while within the workforce which diminish long-term earning potential. An example of
this third type of sacrifice is Beatrice Peters’ relocation between various Ontario towns
as required by Ronald Peters’ career. 66 Even though she worked in the same industry
as her partner, such moves probably diminished her earning power.
Simply cohabiting in an intimate relationship may lead to such sacrifices being
made. In Beatrice Peters’ case, for example, they occurred long before she had
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children. In addition to income, a household requires a certain amount of domestic
labour in order to function. It may be efficient for one party to curtail education or
employment in order to discharge these functions, leaving the other to concentrate on
income-generation. 67 Even in the absence of efficiency gains, this arrangement may be
adopted due to social pressures or gender role expectations. 68
However it is the presence of young children which makes sacrifices in individual
earning potential most likely. 69 While the time required for domestic labour other than
parenting may have declined with technological advances, 70 parenting remains very
time consuming and is, perhaps, becoming more so. 71 Becoming a parent therefore
provides a much stronger incentive to curtail employment or education than does simply
cohabiting or marrying. Many parents must pay for child care in order to continue
working or attending school, and a substantial number are not capable of earning
wages much in excess of what child care costs. For these parents, sacrificing earning
potential in favour of parenting is, in the short term, actually a way to save money. For
other parents, emotional and/or social pressures push towards earning-power
sacrifices.
The judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in the landmark 1992 Supreme Court
Case of Moge v. Moge clearly identified the connection between parenting and
individual earning-potential sacrifices:
The most significant economic consequence of marriage or marriage
breakdown… usually arises from the birth of children. This generally
requires that the wife cut back on her paid labour force participation in
order to care for the children, an arrangement which jeopardizes her
ability to ensure her own income security and independent economic
well being. 72
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Some parents leave the workforce entirely, either permanently or (more commonly) for
temporarily during the infancy of their children. Others remain employed but work fewer
hours, choose flexible employment, or work night shifts so as to balance family
schedules. 73 The percentage of Canadians working weekends, evenings, nights, or
rotating shifts increased from 23% to 29% between 1992 and 2009. 74 The Peters’
arrangement – Ron home with the kids Monday to Friday, Beatrice at home on the
weekend, each parent minding the shop when not parenting – is one example of this
phenomenon. Employment decisions made in order to facilitate parenting can easily
curtail individual or household earning potential in the short or long term. The Peters’
decision to leave guaranteed paycheques in the civil service and open a risky business
which ultimately failed may have been motivated by the birth of their first daughter.

II. B. 2. Quantifying Parenting
What Justice L’Heureux-Dubé demonstrated in Moge remains true today: women
are substantially more likely than men to make sacrifices in their earning potential due
to family responsibilities. For this among other reasons, they are more likely to
experience financial challenges after relationship breakdown. However, the available
data does suggest a demographic trend to a more balanced distribution of wagegenerating and domestic tasks within Canadian households since Moge was decided.
A substantial body of literature exists about the gender allocation of parenting
responsibilities in Canadian households. 75 Perhaps the most obvious measure of
parenting contributions is quantity of time which adults spend with their minor children.
However scholars have identified other relevant contributions to parenting. Joseph
Pleck suggested that paternal involvement can be measured in terms of (i) the nature
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and quality of interaction with children and (ii) taking responsibility for decision-making,
in addition to (iii) absolute number of hours spent in parenting. 76 Duxbury and Higgins
suggest that a parent who is responsible for children and makes decisions on their
behalf experiences more stress than a parent who simply spends time with them. 77 This
might mean that parents in the former group are more likely to make individual earningpower sacrifices in order to cope.

II. B. 3. Persistence of Gender Patterns
However parenting is defined, researchers have found that women today usually
do more of it than men do. Duxbury and Higgins (2001) asked Canadian parents who
had the “primary responsibility for child care” in their families. 63% of women replied
that they did so, and 50% of men replied that their female partners did so. Roughly
39% stated that responsibility was shared. 78 With regard to responsibility for child care,
Duxbury and Higgins found little change between 1991 and 2001. Another interesting
indication comes from the National Longitudinal Survey on Children and Youth. In
conducting this survey, Statistics Canada telephoned Canadian households and asked
to speak to the “person who is the most knowledgeable” about the child. In 92% of the
cases it was the mother of the child who came on the line. 79
The gender pattern may be most pronounced with regard to the youngest
children. 80 Kerry Daly reported that, in 1998, “employed mothers in dual earner families
with a child under 5 years of age spent an average of 91 minutes per day in personal
childcare activities (feeding, washing and dressing children) compared to 47 minutes
among fathers.” 81 Citing a 2001 book about American women, Thomas Oldham recently
noted that "only 34% of married women with children younger than age six work full
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time." 82 Canadian law allows either mothers or fathers to take “parental leave” from
paid employment immediately after the birth of a child. Because this program does not
replace the entire income of the parent, it constitutes a sacrifice in individual earning
power undertaken in order to discharge family responsibilities. Gillian Ranson observes
that mothers remain much more likely than fathers to take parental leave, and this is
another example of the persistent gender role pattern. 83 In fact, fathers are less likely to
have employment interruptions of any kind than childless men are. 84
Beaujot and Ravanera analyzed time-use data from the 2005 General Social
Survey conducted by Statistics Canada, in order to determine how men and women are
dividing paid and unpaid work within families anchored by adult heterosexual
relationships. 85 Their results neatly summarize the persistence of a traditional gender
pattern in Canadian families:
the complementary-traditional (he does more paid work, she does more
unpaid work) is the predominant model with 32.9%, followed by
woman’s double burden (she is doing same amount of, or more, paid
work, and more unpaid work) with 26.8%. … the role-sharing model, in
which they do the same amount of unpaid work, comprises 26.5%. 86

These gender patterns are reflected in another finding from the same study: Canadian
women tend to have jobs with more flexibility but lower pay than those of men. 87 This is
logically consistent with women’s efforts to balance paid employment with domestic
labour.
Most recently, Ranson’s 2010 book Against the Grain provided a helpful literature
review on these issues. 88 The focus of Ranson’s volume is couples who have adopted
equally-shared or female-breadwinner family models. While arguing that this group
constitutes a “vanguard,” she acknowledges that they are not representative of the
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majority. Ranson’s conclusion is that "the bottom line, in Canada as in many other
industrialized countries, is that the responsibilities of parenthood continue to be
'gendered and privatized,' with mothers continuing to face greater demands than
fathers. 89

II. B. 4. Evidence of Change and Gender Role Convergence within the Family
Despite the persistence of traditional gender roles, there is also evidence of
historical and ongoing change. These changes may reduce the prevalence of individual
earning-potential sacrifices, or distribute them more equitably among family members.
This could ease the post-relationship financial disruption which these sacrifices cause.
The most dramatic social change has been the increase in female labour force
participation over the past half-century. Between 1960 and 2000, the proportion of
Canadian women in the labour force rose from 32% to 71%. 90 Canadian women still
earn less than men on average -- $24,400 versus $39,300 per year in 2003. 91
However, the gender wage gap shrank steadily between 1967 and 2003. 92 Over the
course of this period, women’s participation in registered retirement savings plans
(RRSPs) and employer-sponsored pension plans also steadily increased, coming very
close to gender parity on some measures. 93 Kerry Daly observes that the “dual earner
family” (both parents in the work force) is now the “dominant family form in Canada” and
accounts for 7 out of 10 two parent families. 94 Ranson adds that "the majority of young
Canadian families in all regions, as well as in all economic, ethnic and language groups,
have both parents either in the paid labour force or in education or training programs." 95
Looking forward, Beaujot and Ravanera note that the growth of the service sector
and the knowledge economy may benefit female workers more than male workers. This
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is because women are more likely than men are to work in service industries, and also
more likely to pursue post-secondary education. 96 Increased female labour force
participation has certainly not “solved” the problem of post-relationship economic
disruption caused by individual earning potential sacrifices. However, it has reduced
markedly the number of women who have no capacity to earn income after a divorce or
separation.
Significant, although less dramatic shifts have also taken place in the work and
parenting behaviour of Canadian men. There has been some decline in male labour
force participation since 1971, roughly the same period during which women’s labour
force participation was dramatically rising. 97 Referring to American data, Ellen Galinsky
and her colleagues observe that “men are taking more overall responsibility for the care
of their children in 2008 than in 1992, according to themselves and their
wives/partners.” 98 Daly confirms that in Canada too, “the dominant trend in the
contributions that women and men make to parenting and domestic work is one of
convergence with women doing less and men doing more.” 99 The Peters’ parenting
arrangement in Sault Ste. Marie is representative of this trend, with Ron acting as the
primary stay-at-home parent. 100 Gillian Ranson argued that the non-traditional
Canadian households which she studied (like the Peters) are at the vanguard of
“change evident on a global scale,” and that "all this change, however slow and slight, is
in the direction of more egalitarian relationships in the home." 101

II. B. 5. Post-Relationship Effects of Sacrifices
Earning potential sacrifices are and will continue to be a consequence of family
life for many if not most Canadians. As noted above, this is most powerfully true for
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parents. The more non-paid family responsibility or labour an individual assumes, the
more likely it is that he or she will curtail education or labour force participation. When
and if those relationships end, what are the continuing effects of the earning-potential
sacrifices which individual family members make?
The judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Moge gives a foundational account
of the connection between earning-potential sacrifices within relationships and
economic problems afterwards:
Once the marriage dissolves, the kinds of non monetary contributions
made by the wife may result in significant market disabilities. The
sacrifices she has made at home catch up with her and the balance
shifts in favour of the husband who has remained in the work force and
focused his attention outside the home. In effect, she is left with a
diminished earning capacity and may have conferred upon her husband
an embellished one.
…
The financial consequences of the end of a marriage extend beyond the
simple loss of future earning power or losses directly related to the care
of children. They will often encompass loss of seniority, missed
promotions and lack of access to fringe benefits such as pension plans,
life, disability, dental and health insurance. 102

A substantial economic literature seeks to quantify the “wage depreciation effect”
– the long-term impact on an individual’s earnings of temporary absences from the
workforce. As noted above, leaving the workforce is the most dramatic (although not the
only) type of sacrifice in earning potential which an individual can make due to family
responsibilities. In her 2005 article, Kathleen Spivey reviewed and added to this
literature. 103 Her study confirmed that “total non-employment time has a statistically
significant depreciation effect on wages” and that a wage depreciation effect persisted
from early-career interruptions even many years later. 104 With regard to gender
differences, Spivey found that “wage losses associated with non-employment were less
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severe for women than for men, although more past interruptions seemed to matter for
women than men." 105 Robert Leckey notes the continuing economic disadvantage faced
by women leaving intimate relationships, which is at least partially attributable to the
wage depreciation effect:
recently divorced or separated mothers remain financially worse off than
recently divorced or separated fathers … 44 percent of recently divorced
or separated mothers have an annual personal income of less than
$30,000, contrasted with 19 percent of recently divorced or separated
fathers. 106

The spouse who did not make such sacrifices during the relationship has usually
benefitted somewhat from the domestic focus of the spouse who did so. 107 For
example, Ron Peters’ ascent through the ranks of Parks Canada to become manager of
Pukaskwa National Park might have been impossible had Beatrice not been willing to
move with him between various postings. 108
The legal remedy of spousal support is, among other things, designed to
compensate the spouse who made earning-power sacrifices using the income of the
spouse who did not. 109 However, spousal support is by no means a complete solution
to this problem. It is ordered and/or paid in only a small minority of divorces and
separations, and in the Peters’ case spousal support was not claimed. Carol Rogerson
estimated in 2002 that spousal support was paid in only 10-25% of divorce cases, 110
although it is possible that the development of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines
since that date have increased its prevalence. The Guidelines themselves propose a
payor income “floor” of $20,000. If neither spouse earns more than that amount, it is
very unlikely that spousal support will be paid. 111
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II. C. Conflict arising from relationship break-down
Family challenges are created not only by the economic life of the intact family,
but also by what happens when the intimate relationship at the heart of the family
dissolves. Most relationship break-downs are characterized by some degree of conflict
between the adult parties. The Peters’ case had an unusually high degree of conflict,
but family justice system workers will recognize as familiar many of the manifestations
of hostility from that case. If the family includes children who are old enough to be
aware of the break-down, then they are likely to be affected by it in some way. This
section will briefly review the literature on post-relationship conflict, and the costs which
it imposes upon adults, children, and society.
Although post-relationship conflict may occur without any legal manifestation,
conflict arising from relationship break-down frequently results in legal disputes. A 2009
telephone survey conducted for the Ontario Civil Legal Needs (OCLN) Project asked
low- and middle-class Ontarians which civil legal problems they had experienced in the
previous three years. 112 "Family relationship problems" were reported by 12% of the
respondents, and by 30% of all those who reported having any type of civil legal
problem. Family relationship problems were, by a substantial margin, the type of civil
legal problem most often experienced by low- and middle-class Ontarians. The
prevalence of family problems was greater than the combined prevalence of the
second- and third- most common civil problems. 113
When family conflict does manifest itself in a legal form, it very often continues as
such for extended periods of time. The OCLN telephone survey found that, among the
respondents who had experienced a family relationship problem at any time in the
previous three years, 44% reported that the problem was still unresolved at the time of
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the survey. 114 Three-quarters of those in this group stated that they had been trying to
resolve the family relationship problem for a year or more. 115 The Peters filed
applications and counter-applications in January and February of 2006, and the
judgment in their case was not released until November of 2009 – almost three years
later.
There is an extensive literature about the effects of divorce and/or dysfunctional
family conflict on adults and children. A key conceptual issue in this literature is
distinguishing the effects of conflict from the effects of the end of the relationship. 116
The scholarship at one point debated the impact of divorce itself on children, asking
whether divorce is “bad” or “good” for children. The general consensus until perhaps the
1980s was that divorce was, at best, a necessary evil. While this line of inquiry
continues in some quarters, 117 it now appears that conflict (especially violence) is the
greater cause of mental health damage to children and adults, as opposed to
relationship break-down itself. The end of the relationship may in fact have positive
effects if it ends or alleviates conflict by putting some distance between the parties.
While children have substantial resilience to the effects of family break-down, 118
there is also little doubt among child development experts that exposure to serious interparental conflict can leave long-term scars. 119 For example, the judge who decided the
Peters’ case identified a serious risk that the children might be
placed in the middle of much hostility between their parents who would
be forced by the nature of the custodial arrangement to have more
contact with each other than they have at the present time … the
children are far more comfortable when their parents have less contact
with each other. 120
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It is at least plausible that family conflict can reduce the ability of children to be
productive and contributing members of society in the long run, although this is very
difficult to quantify. If so, this is a significant social and economic cost. Post-relationship
conflict is inevitable, but the extent and pathology of family conflict is influenced by the
response to it. 121 In evaluating potential responses to family challenges, reducing
conflict –especially inter-parental conflict to which children are exposed – must be one
of the goals.

III. PREVENTATIVE RESPONSES TO FAMILY CHALLENGES
Part II of this paper identified three key family challenges: (i) the economic
vulnerability of Canadian families, (ii) sacrifices in earning potential undertaken in intact
families, and (iii) conflict arising on relationship break-down. Andrew Schepard has
proposed that family conflict be identified and treated as a public health epidemic, due
to its disease-like impacts upon society. 122 This means that both prevention and
treatment are important. This Part will focus on the ways in which the government might
prevent family challenges or reduce their severity before they occur.

III. A. Prevention of Relationship Break-Down
One way to reduce the impact of family challenges would be to reduce the
number of intimate relationships which are voluntarily dissolved. This was, indeed, a
central social goal for many decades in Canada. Books were written, and professionals
trained, with the goal of preventing divorce. 123 Section 9 of the Divorce Act also reflects
the policy objective of “saving” marriages. It provides that family lawyers must “draw to
the attention” of their clients to the statutory objective of “reconciliation of spouses,” and
provide information about “marriage counselling or guidance facilities known to him or
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her that might be able to assist the spouses to achieve a reconciliation.” 124 Some
American scholars argue that preserving or “protecting” marriages should be an explicit
goal of family law. 125 For example, “covenant marriage,” a form of union which is
designed to be more difficult to dissolve than normal marriage, is available to couples in
some American states. 126 The focus of this scholarship has generally been on saving
marriages, as opposed to intimate cohabitations generally. In fact, many of those who
wish to “save marriage” from divorce also perceive non-marital cohabitation as a “threat”
to marriage which society should resist.
While the law can make the legal state of marriage more difficult to exit, it is difficult to
see how it can preserve family affection or harmony. Nor can people be forced to
cohabit. Preserving the legal form of a marriage which lacks affection, harmony,
or cohabitation has no apparent purpose. For these reasons, it seems more
promising to assume that large numbers of intimate relationships will continue to
dissolve before death does them part, and to examine ways to prevent or mitigate
the challenges which arise when they do so.

III. B. Prevention of Challenges Arising Upon Break-down
This section will consider what society can do for members of intact families so
as to reduce the severity of the challenges they will face when and if those relationships
dissolve. Richard Susskind seems to be correct in suggesting that people "prefer to
have a fence at the top of a cliff rather than an ambulance at the bottom." 127 It is
worthwhile to consider how family challenges might be prevented.
A key question which has emerged from the LCO’s public consultations pertains
to the idea of “early intervention” in family disputes. 128 How early is early enough? The
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answer might be that early intervention must begin during cohabitations, in anticipation
of the fact that many cohabitations will eventually be ended voluntarily. One interesting
finding from the Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project telephone survey suggests some
scope for prevention of challenges. 14% of the respondents said that in the future they
would be likely to experience family relationship problems. 129 If it is true that many
Ontarians anticipate future family challenges, they may be receptive to initiatives to
prevent or mitigate those challenges. The government should ensure that its public
information initiatives about family law are made available and accessible to
Ontarians who are still cohabiting in intact relationships, not only to those who
have decided to cease cohabiting.

III. B. 1. Education
The severity of the conflict which arises upon relationship break-down is to some
extent dependent on the manner in which the parties communicate and address that
conflict. Education as prophylaxis for dysfunctional family conflict could conceivably
start before the conflict arises, if it were delivered in high school or as a pre-requisite to
marriage. 130 The Ontario secondary school curriculum already includes a course
entitled “Healthy Active Living Education.” In this course, students are “given
opportunities to refine their decision- making, conflict-resolution, and interpersonal skills,
with a view to enhancing their mental health and their relationships with others.” 131 The
government should consider teaching strategies for communication and conflictresolution in intimate relationships in the context of the “Healthy Active Living
Education” in Grade 12, or in another course. Doing so might enhance Ontarians’
ability to deal with post-relationship conflict in a manner which mitigates rather than
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exacerbates it. It could conceivably even increase the chance that intimate
relationships remain harmonious and healthy.

III. B. 2. Marriage and Cohabitation Contracts
Individuals entering a marriage or cohabitation are permitted to establish by
contract what their financial obligations to each other will be when and if their
relationship dissolves. 132 Doing so can substantially reduce the potential for
subsequent conflict and disagreement, and can create clear expectations for the
parties. Justice Québec publicizes information about cohabitation contracts on a
website, which includes an explicit recommendation that
People who chose to live in a de facto union should specify how they
intend to live as a couple and how they intend to manage their family
relationship to avoid disputes and disagreements… because a written
document provides more lasting proof than a verbal agreement, it is in
your interest to sign a written cohabitation contract with your de facto
spouse. 133

By contrast, the family law section of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General does
not appear to mention cohabitation or marriage contracts. 134 The Government should
consider expanding the information which it provides about pre-marital and
cohabitation contracts. Potentially, the Ministry’s web site could include an
explicit recommendation to create such a contract, or a web-based tool to help
parties draft contracts.
However, it is very difficult for individuals to negotiate about entitlements and
obligations which they never expect to become real, insofar as people generally do not
enter intimate relationships while contemplating their dissolution. If the entitlements and
obligations do become real, this often does not occur for many years after the contract
was initially negotiated. For these among other reasons, very few Ontarians enter
33

marriage or cohabitation contracts. It is not clear that amendments to the Ministry web
site would substantially change this reality.

III. B. 3. Discouraging Earning-Potential Sacrifices: Public Investments in Child
Care
As established above, sacrifices in earning potential undertaken for family
reasons can lead to economic challenges after relationship break-down. Some such
sacrifices are an inevitable and healthy response on the part of Ontarians to their family
responsibilities. However, Ontario might want to discourage the most dramatic form of
earning potential sacrifice – extended or permanent departures from the labour force.
To put the point in positive terms, the state may wish to encourage continuing
employment and/or educational activities by parents.
As noted above, parenting is the family responsibility which is most likely to lead
Ontarians to make earning-potential sacrifices. Therefore, increasing the supply and
affordability of non-parent child care is one way to reduce the need for those sacrifices
and thereby reduce the post-separation disruption which they cause. This is particularly
true for mothers. Willem Adema observes that “the development of formal childcare
allows female employment to expand further, both in terms of the number of female
workers and the hours they engage in paid employment.” 135 As female labour force
participation rates have increased, there has been a commensurate increase in the
proportion of non-parental child care. 136
However, by comparison to other wealthy countries Canada has made very
limited public investments in child care. The OECD found in 2006 that Canada’s
investment in early childhood services was equal to only 0.3% of GDP. 137 This was the
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lowest figure among 14 OECD countries studied in the report. 138 This report also noted
that only approximately 24% of Canadian children between the ages of 0 and 6 have
access to regulated day care. 139
Despite repeated electoral promises, there is still no national non-parental child
care program. Indeed the most recent substantive federal initiative was the creation of
the Canada Child Tax Benefit, which takes the form of a monthly cash payment to
families with minor children. 140 While this initiative may facilitate the purchase of private
child care, it does not increase the supply of non-parental child care and provides no
incentive to parental labour force participation. It was not intended to be, and does not
serve as, a deterrent to sacrifices in earning potential.
Quebec is the exception to generally low overall public investment in child care.
In this province public provision of day care is established and widespread. According to
OECD statistics published in 2005, 40% of all of Canada’s childcare capacity is in
Quebec despite the fact that only 22% of Canadian children live there. 141 In 2001,
Ontario’s provincial government spent $232 on childcare for every child aged 0-12. This
compares to $980 per child in Quebec, and a national average of $386 per child.
However, the provincial government’s recent initiative to provide free full-day
kindergarten is a step in the right direction, insofar as this will facilitate labour-force
participation by the parents of four- and five-year olds. 142 State provision of child
care reduces the likelihood of parental earning-power sacrifices, which in turn
reduces economic challenges in the wake of relationship break-down. In
weighing the costs and benefits of family policies, this fact should be considered.
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III. B. 4. Discouraging Earning-Potential Sacrifices: Tax Reform
Feminist scholars have pointed out that some elements of Canada’s tax system
disincentivize income-generating labour by individuals who cohabit with others who earn
more than they do. For example, Canadians are now permitted to contribute $5,000 per
year into tax-free savings accounts (TFSAs) which offer significant tax savings. A
married individual is permitted to contribute $5,000 per year into his or her own account,
plus an additional $5,000 per year into his or her spouse’s account. The higher-earning
spouse can do so regardless of whether the other spouse is earning income. The
family can therefore receive the entire $10,000 per year tax shelter benefit despite the
fact that only one individual is earning income to make contributions. An alternative
would be to allow individuals to contribute only to their own TFSAs. If this were the
case, the TFSA would operate as an incentive to both spouses to earn income. Only by
doing so would the family be able to obtain the full $10,000 per year tax benefit. 143
Governments should consider restructuring benefits such as TFSA so that they
incentivize income-generation by both spouses, and disincentivize earning-power
sacrifices.
Kathleen Lahey argues that the tax system is one contributor to “unrelenting
pressure on women to substitute unpaid work for paid work at the margins.” 144 One
source of this pressure which she identifies is “joint tax instruments,” defined as “tax
provision[s] that adjus[t] tax liability either upward or downward on the basis of having a
spouse or common-law partner.” 145 For example, the dependent spouse credit reduces
tax liability when a taxpayer’s spouse is being supported by the taxpayer. 146 Lahey
argues that that joint tax instruments are disincentives to women’s labour force
participation because their benefit is reduced or lost if the spouse with lower earning
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potential joins the labour force. Whether this spouse is male or female, the salient point
is that joint tax instruments may encourage sacrifices in earning potential, and thereby
exacerbate economic problems post-separation. Joint tax instruments have complex
costs and benefits, but it should be recognized by law-makers that their
disincentive to labour force participation is among their drawbacks.
Lisa Philipps has also observed that tax law can act as an incentive or
disincentive to intra-household transfers of wealth to the lower-earning spouse. 147 For
example, Canadians are now allowed to “split” pension income with their spouses so as
to obtain tax benefits. 148 However, the split may be purely “notional” – legal title to the
pension income need not be transferred to the lower-earning spouse. If income splitting
were to be dependent on actual legal transfers, then the economically weaker spouse
would thereby be empowered during the relationship. This could reduce the economic
challenges experienced by that spouse after relationship break-down, especially for
those who cohabited in a non-marital relationship and are therefore not entitled to
statutory property division. 149 While requiring legal transfers of property would increase
the intrusiveness of the tax system, the legislature should consider whether this
reform might bring about a more equitable distribution of property within intact
relationships, and thereby reduce post-separation economic challenges.

III. B. 5. State Compensation of Caregiving
An alternative to discouraging earning-potential sacrifices is to compensate the
individuals who make those sacrifices in order to perform caregiving tasks. Doing so
may lead to them having more savings and economic independence with which to
weather the shock of relationship dissolution. Some feminist scholars have argued that
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the state should compensate caregivers directly. 150 The Law Commission of Canada’s
Beyond Conjugality report proposed consideration of refundable tax credits for
caregivers, or direct grants to them. 151 The Income Tax Act currently allocates tax
credits both to parents of minor children and to caregivers for the elderly and
disabled. 152 However other feminists, including Kathleen Lahey, respond that
compensating caregiving would simply reinforce traditional gender expectations and
push caregivers out of the workforce. 153
However, state compensation of caregiving has limited potential as a tool to
promote economic independence after relationship breakdown. It is not clear that tax
credits or even direct payments provided to a member of an intact relationship will be
preserved for the benefit of that family member, as opposed to becoming part of the
general “family finances.” It might be possible to somehow segregate these funds for
the personal benefit of the caregiver should the relationship eventually dissolve, e.g. by
adding them to the Canada Pension Plan account of the caregiver. However doing so
would mean that the financial benefit would not be available to the caregiver and his or
her family at the time when the caregiving was actually happening.

IV. POST-BREAKDOWN RESPONSE TO CHALLENGES

IV. A. Responding to Challenges After Relationship Breakdown
Even if preventative initiatives are pursued, relationship breakdown will continue
to confront Ontarians with legal and financial challenges. This section will address
techniques for responding to these challenges after they arise. It will begin with the
least adversarial methods, and work towards traditional civil litigation. Section D, below,
will consider the costs and benefits of administrative responses to family challenges.
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With regard to all potential responses to relationship breakdown, a key fact is that, as
the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper noted, family problems come in “clusters.” 154
For example, while parenting disputes are fundamentally different from financial
disputes, they present themselves within the same families, and family courts must
respond to them together. More broadly, family law problems “cluster” with other types
of legal problems. The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project Report identified family
relationship issues as among the types of legal problems which are most likely to be
experienced in tandem with other legal problems. 155

IV. A. 1. Supplying Legal Information to the Public
Legal information can be defined to include both substantive information about
family law, and information about legal procedures and dispute resolution options. Legal
information is distinct from legal services which are personalized and provided directly
by professionals. 156 The provision of legal information is very inexpensive, by
comparison to other government responses to post-relationship challenges. Information,
once created, can be reproduced for very little cost for an unlimited number of users.
Moreover, unlike legal services, ADR, or litigation, consuming legal information has little
or no cost for the individuals who access it (assuming that the government provides for
free.) From a cost-benefit analysis point of view, state initiatives to create legal
information are worth undertaking even if they have only modest benefits for Ontarians
experiencing family challenges. In other words, because the cost is small, only a small
benefit need be demonstrated for legal information. Very real benefits do seem to be
offered by family legal information initiatives, and the government has responded with
what is already a fairly comprehensive campaign. However, this section will propose a
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few initiatives which might make a broader range of legal information accessible to a
broader range of Ontarians.
Ontario made substantial investments in providing legal information about family
challenges this area. Family Law Information Centres (FLIC) are found in all of our
family courts. 157 These contain brochures and other documents. Some but not all
FLICs are staffed by employees who provide general information about the system.
Law Help Ontario, at the 361 University Ave. court in Toronto, offers information to selfrepresented litigants using an innovative combination of lawyers and written
information. 158 The province has also provided funding for internet-based family
information initiatives. Statutes and case law are increasingly available for free
online. 159 The Ministry of the Attorney General has recently expanded its “Family Law
Resources” page, which now includes a comprehensive “frequently asked questions”
section and pictures of sample courtroom layouts. 160 The Ontario Civil Legal Needs
Project asked Ontarians about their familiarity and experiences with five public
information services. 161 They found that “although only 1 to 8 per cent of those
surveyed had heard of any of the websites, their satisfaction levels were very high (81
per cent and higher).” 162 This suggests that the quality and utility of these public
information sources is very good, but the government needs to put more effort into
publicizing them, so that more Ontarians may benefit.
More narrowly-focused online initiatives include the Family Law Education
for Women (FLEW) site. 163 The central message of the FLEW site is that all Ontarians,
regardless of ethnic background or family situation, have the right to the protection of
our family law statutes. 164 The FLEW website appears to provide information which
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helpful and accurate for both women and men. It is unclear why it is branded as being
“for women,” given that our statutes and case law apply equally to men and women and
given that men and women both need information about family law. Given that this
web-site is funded by the provincial government, the government should ask that
it be rebranded to emphasize its utility to all Ontarians.
The internet appears to be the most logical medium for delivering family law
information to Ontarians. The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project found that, even
among low- and middle-class Ontarians, 84% have access to the internet. 165 However,
most of the internet-based legal information initiatives identified above are
predominantly text-based. (FLEW is an exception, providing audio streams of
information and sign-language videos.) Given that many Ontarians have limited English
literacy, the province should consider providing family law information on
websites in video format.
Parent Information Sessions are group classes in which information about
separation and family law are presented through oral presentations and videos. These
are mandatory in Toronto’s Superior Court of Justice 166 and are available on a voluntary
basis in certain other family courts. Parenting information sessions are soon to be
launched in the Brampton family court. 167 Based on the author’s observations, 168 there
is a fairly limited degree of interactivity in these sessions. Participants are allowed to
ask some questions but queries about the specific facts of a case are discouraged and
the primary mode is one-way provision of information from the leaders to the
participants. For this reason, these programs are more appropriately classified as “legal
information” rather than “legal services.”
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The literature is somewhat ambivalent about the benefits of Parent Information
Sessions, which are usually evaluated (if at all) in terms of whether or not they reduce
litigation. Ellis and Anderson (2003) reviewed the literature and conducted their own
study of Family Information Sessions being held in Ontario at that time for divorcing
parents. Their conclusion was that these programs reduce use of court resources by
inducing settlement. 169 However, not all research on these programs has replicated the
results about reduced use of court resources. Versaevel studied a voluntary parent
education program in Washoe County, Nevada. 170 She reviewed the court files of
litigants who had and who had not participated in the classes, and concluded that "no
clear correlation could be found that supported the idea that parent education classes
could help resolve matters faster.” 171 Shelley Kierstead compared a sample of litigants
who had attended a program with a control group which had not. 172 She found that,
although there were significant differences between the two groups with regard to
certain elements of litigiousness, “considered as one combined variable, there was
statistically significant difference in litigiousness between the sample group and the
control group.” 173 A more comprehensive evaluation of Parenting Information
Sessions is necessary before their publicly-funded expansion can be
recommended.
A great deal of legal information which would be useful to Ontarians at the time of
relationship breakdown remains inaccessible to them or expensive enough to be
beyond the reach of most self-represented middle class litigants. For example, the Law
Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) conducts Continuing Legal Education seminars, for
which lawyers write research papers without compensation. LSUC has an online
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archive of all of these papers, and a database of video-recordings from the seminars.
However, these are not publicly available for free, 174 despite the fact that LSUC does
not generally compensate the lawyers who deliver the seminars and write the CLE
papers. For example, LSUC held a four hour “Six Minute Family Lawyer” program in
December 2009, which provided a broad overview of key issues in family law. This
program is archived online, but costs $150.00 to access. Most other family law CLE
programs cost even more. In light of LSUC’s statutory duty to “act so as to
facilitate access to justice for the people of Ontario” and “protect the public
interest,” 175 the province should ask LSUC to make family law CLE materials
publicly available for free or reduce their prices. If this is not possible, these CLE
materials should at least be made available in Ontario’s public libraries.
The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) have quickly become a central
feature of spousal support law in Canada. 176 However, by comparison to the Child
Support Guidelines, the SSAG are relatively complex and difficult for many selfrepresented litigants to use. Determining a spousal support entitlement using the “with
child support” formula in the SSAG would require either advanced math skills or access
to software such as DivorceMate. 177 Using DivorceMate to calculate a single spousal
support entitlement costs at least $350. 178 The provincial and federal governments
should cooperate in creating free on-line software to calculate Spousal Support
Advisory Guidelines ranges.
Richard Susskind has noted that people who have legal rights or obligations are
often unaware of them. 179 This point seems particularly true in the family law context.
For example, the matrimonial home remedies provided by Part II of the Family Law Act
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are probably not front of mind for individuals at the time of relationship breakdown. 180
However the rights provided therein, such as the equal right of spouses to possess the
matrimonial home, 181 are potentially very valuable. Susskind proposes that the state
might proactively provide legal information to citizens at the time when they need it,
using biographical information about the individual possessed by the state:
once an individual builds up a profile of his or her activities, or joins
communities, whether open or closed, of people with shared interests,
then distilled, relevant, and tailored briefings will be sent to them. In this
way, citizens may be urged to be proactive. 182

Marriage and child-birth might be examples of activities which would trigger
"tailored briefings." When an Ontarian citizen gets married or becomes a parent,
the province could send an information package by email or post. This package
would, among other things, identify family law issues which that citizen might
eventually encounter. While privacy concerns would be a possible impediment to
such an initiative, the idea is certainly an intriguing option for providing legal information
about family challenges to Ontarians.

IV. A. 2. Increasing the supply and affordability of legal services
No matter how comprehensive and accessible, legal information is not a
complete substitute for personalized legal services. 183 Services can be offered by
lawyers, or by other professionals such as paralegals and social workers who have
experience working with the family justice system. A central finding of the LCO’s public
consultations is that there is a broad diversity of different “entry points” to the family
justice system, staffed by a wide variety of different professionals who provide services
and information. 184
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However, large numbers of Ontarians use the family justice system with little if
any personalized assistance. The Ontario Bar Association recently found that that 40%
of all civil litigants lack lawyers, and that the rate of self-representation among family
litigants is even greater than this average. 185 In 2009, another report stated that
approximately 70% of family litigants are unrepresented. 186 While some of these
individuals do not wish to be represented, many if not most would like to have legal
representation but do not believe that they can afford it. 187 A survey of Kingston family
court litigants without lawyers published in 2005 found that 83% stated that they were
unable to afford the legal fees. 188
The actual cost of family legal services varies widely. A survey of lawyers
conducted by Canadian Lawyer magazine found that the average legal fee for a
contested divorce in Ontario is $12,602. The average fee for a civil case culminating in
a two-day trial was $45,477. 189 However, it also appears that many Ontarians obtain
more affordable legal services, probably because their matters are not “contested” and
do not culminate in trials. A 2009 telephone survey conducted for the Ontario Civil
Legal Needs Project identified low- and middle-class Ontarians who had sought legal
assistance for a non-criminal matter in the previous three years. 190 Among those who
had obtained legal services, 28% said that the services were free, and an additional
19% said that they paid less than $1,000. 191 Legal Aid Ontario reported that, in 20082009, the cost of the average family client funded by that agency was $1826.00. 192
Nevertheless, the OCLN survey also found that many individuals experiencing
family challenges have particular difficulty accessing legal services. 81% of those who
had experienced this type of challenge in the previous three years had sought legal
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services, but 30% of those who did so “had difficulty” in obtaining it. 193 Among low-and
middle-class Ontarians who had a civil justice problem but did not seek legal
assistance, the perceived cost of lawyers was by far the most common reason for not
doing so. 194 Lowering the cost of legal services would make them more accessible to
Ontarians experiencing post-separation family challenges. Having access to
experienced and competent professional help would certainly reduce the strain which
family challenges place on Ontarians in this position. There are a variety of initiatives by
which the province might lower the cost of legal services, each of which has a distinct
set of costs and benefits.
One obvious option would be to increase the supply of legal aid available for
family law disputes. Legal aid allows individuals to obtain the services of a lawyer paid
by the government. These services are available for family law matters through the
Family Law offices run by Legal Aid Ontario (LAO).
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In 2008-2009, LAO issued

30,107 certificates for family matters, spending $50,755,000.00 on these services. 196
However, it is very difficult to obtain comprehensive LAO-funded representation for
private family law disputes which do not include child protection or criminal elements. 197
One recent report claimed that "over the past decade there has been a 30% drop in
lawyers accepting certificates from family law clients who qualify for legal aid." 198
One of the most intriguing findings of the OCLN survey was that “One in three
respondents … said they prefer to resolve their legal needs by themselves with legal
advice, but not necessarily with the assistance of a legal professional.” 199 The
provincial government might wish to respond by de-emphasizing funding of
comprehensive legal representation in favour of providing more limited legal
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services to a broader group of people. Examples of these more limited services
include LSUC’s a telephone Lawyer Referral Service which offers members of the
public a free 30 minute consultation with a lawyer. 200 Other forms of free legal services
currently available in Ontario family courts include duty counsel and volunteer law
student assistance from the Pro Bono Students Canada Family Law Program. Another
way to make public dollars go further is to subsidize legal clinics which provide limited
family legal services at a reduced and predictable rate. Many Ontarians who are unable
to afford family legal services as they are currently structured would be able to pay a
smaller and more predictable amount. For example, Atlanta’s Family Law Information
Centers offer 30 minute consultations which in some cases carry a nominal fee of
roughly $10. 201
Publicly-funded personalized legal services can also be provided remotely,
and the government should explore this possibility. The LSUC Lawyer Referral
Service mentioned above 202 might be complemented by a website to which Ontarians
could submit queries about family disputes. Many questions could be answered by
paralegals or workers in low-cost jurisdictions abroad; this would allow a more
expansive service to be provided at a lower cost. 203
If the government wishes to reduce the cost and increase the accessibility of
legal services without further public expenditure, then it might consider lowering the
barriers to the private-sector provision of legal services. 204 At present, the
Solicitors Act makes it illegal for anyone not “admitted and enrolled as a solicitor” to
represent another individual in court. 205 This rule (which has very limited exceptions)
has made it very difficult for paralegals or others to provide legal services to Ontarians
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experiencing family challenges. Canada’s Competition Bureau has argued convincingly
that “law societies should neither prohibit related service providers (such as
paralegals…) from performing legal tasks, nor limit their ability to do so, unless
there is compelling evidence of demonstrable harm to the public.” 206 Whether
there is sufficient evidence of demonstrable harm in this case is an open question.
The province subjected paralegals to LSUC regulation in 2007, 207 despite the
Competition Bureau’s warning that “to the extent that paralegals need to be regulated,
the proper avenue for this is not through the law societies, given the obvious conflict of
interest that arises from having one competitor regulate another.” 208 In May of 2010 a
resolution was briefly brought before the LSUC annual general meeting which would
have opened a discussion about authorizing paralegal family law practice. 209 This
proposal was met with fierce opposition from Ontario lawyers, and was withdrawn
before being considered. 210 The objection of many lawyers to paralegal family law
practice was summarized by Mary Reilly, treasurer of the Family Lawyers Association of
Ontario:
Our concern is that family law is extremely complicated. You have to
have knowledge of a lot of different pieces of legislation. It isn't a case of
just giving them a couple of courses, and they're up to speed. 211

Certain areas of family law are more complicated than others, and Reilly’s argument
might be more valid for some areas than for others. One option would be to allow
paralegal practice with regard to child support and custody and access, which
are not, in most cases, legally complex. Property division, spousal support, and
other issues could be reserved for lawyers. These latter issues are both more
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complex and more likely to be relevant by wealthier individuals who are better able to
afford lawyers’ fees.
Short of licensing paralegal family law practice, there are various other ways in
which the province might make it easier to provide family legal services. For example,
LSUC might consider waiving the articling requirement for law school graduates
wishing to practice family law. Family lawyers might be exempted from some of
the obligations which the Law Society places on lawyers which increase the cost
of doing business, such as the new continuing professional development
requirement. 212 It is at least possible that Ontario lawyers are actually overqualified for
the average family law dispute experienced by lower- and middle-class Ontarians. If so,
and if reducing qualification requirements would increase the supply of family legal
services and thereby lower their price, the Law Society and the government should
consider doing so. 213
The cost of such initiatives would take the form of lowered standards, which
might or might not translate into less satisfactory services being provided to clients. The
value of having competent, knowledgeable, and dedicated people working in the system
should not be underestimated. Julie Lassonde reported that one of the reasons why the
LCO’s public consultations succeeded in bringing together individuals with divergent
perspectives on highly emotional matters was the trust relationships which those
individuals had with their lawyers and other service providers. 214 These lawyers and
service providers were able to convene round-table meetings and focus groups. This
attests to the profound value of high-quality, personalized service in dealing with family
challenges.
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As important as high quality services are, it is not clear that law school and the
LSUC bar admission course are necessary and sufficient preparation for providing
services of this nature to Ontarians experiencing post-relationship family challenges.
One interesting point of reference regarding the value of lawyers’ services versus other
services is a report authored by Rae Kaspiew and her colleagues evaluating Australia’s
2006 Family Law reforms. 215 Individuals who had used the family justice system and
had obtained services from lawyers and/or non-lawyers were asked whether they would
recommend the services they obtained. Lawyers did not produce higher rates of client
satisfaction than most of the alternative service providers. 216 It would be very useful to
study the satisfaction rates of Ontario clients of family lawyers and alternative family
service providers. 217 Such a study might confirm or deny the proposition that only
licensed lawyers are capable of providing useful legal services to Ontarians
experiencing family challenges. 218
Another option is to restructure the way in which legal services are provided. In
the traditional model, a lawyer is retained to represent a client until the client’s legal
problem is resolved. Fees are calculated on an hourly basis. While the client may
withdraw from this arrangement at any time, he or she often has little idea at the outset
how much it will cost to resolve the problem. In addition to the hourly rate itself, the
unpredictability of the final bill is one of the factors which make legal services seem
unaffordable to middle class Ontarians. Richard Susskind proposes an alternative to
this model, which would involve a lower and more predictable price tag for the
consumer:
decomposing legal work that has been, or should be undertaken … into
constituent tasks and allocating these to the least costly sources of
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service that we can find, so long as this multi-sourcing and mass
customization does not fail to deliver the requisite quality of guidance
that the non-lawyer needs. 219

“Unbundling” of legal services has been identified by the Ontario Civil Legal Needs
project as a possible way to increase affordability. 220 This would allow clients to do
some things for themselves while obtaining legal assistance for the most challenging
portions of litigation (such as oral advocacy.) The Ontario government should work
with the Law Society to encourage the provision of unbundled family law
services, provided that doing so would make them more accessible without
excessively reducing quality.

IV. A. 3. Alternative / Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR)
ADR can be defined as any structured dispute-resolution process other than
courtroom adjudication. While the “A” in ADR once stood for “alternative,” it is
increasingly being used to stand for “appropriate.” 221 This signifies that adjudication is
no longer the privileged or primary avenue for the resolution of family law disputes. 222
However, the word “appropriate” also leaves open the possibility that a litigation process
may in some cases be more appropriate than other alternatives. For example, it has
been argued that, at least in cases of power imbalance of domestic abuse, the
structured environment of a court-room offers the best opportunity for the rights and
interests of vulnerable parties to be protected. 223
The rise of ADR in family law can be traced to the “divorce revolution” which
began in the late 1960s. As a result of legal and social changes, courts were newly
confronted with large numbers of family disputes. 224 They responded, in part, by
experimenting with a wide variety of programs and interventions, the primary purpose of
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which was to encourage settlement. 225 These public sector, court-connected programs
and interventions were an early form ADR, although most ADR in Ontario today is
conducted in the private sector.
The continuing demand for ADR services is created by the fact that family
litigation is very expensive for the parties, their children, and the state. Scholars, policymakers, and Canadians confronting family challenges therefore look for other ways of
resolving family disputes which impose fewer costs. 226 Nor is the case for ADR made
exclusively by critics of lawyers -- lawyers themselves are embracing it. 227 For example,
the Ontario Bar Association Family Law Section, a group of lawyers, recently joined with
two ADR organizations in calling for “non-adversarial options” to become the "primary
framework for resolving family matters." 228
Today, the most common forms of ADR in the Ontario family law context are
collaborative family law, mediation, and arbitration. The latter two may be practiced
independently of each other, or may be combined as mediation-arbitration (“MedArb”). 229 Beyond these core techniques, some scholars would give ADR a broader
definition, for example including solicitor negotiation or custody evaluation under this
rubric. 230
The evaluation literature has sought to weigh the costs and benefits of different
types of ADR. Commonly, a specific type of mediation, assessment, or parent
education is evaluated in terms of the number of cases which settled during or
immediately after the process. 231 While these studies often have very small sample
sizes, 232 they do help establish what programs help reduce the costs of litigation.
Qualitative techniques such as interviews and surveys have been deployed in some of
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these evaluations in order to more comprehensively analyze costs and benefits. 233
Comprehensive qualitative evaluations of family process are more labour-intensive than
quantitative reports on settlement rates, and is therefore often conducted by the state
itself 234 or with public funding. 235 While such small scale pilot projects are perhaps the
most common method by which costs and benefits of alternative mechanisms have
been studied, a valuable set of sources go beyond assessing a single program.
Experiments and literature about costs and benefits have originated in state- and
province-wide initiatives 236 and in partnerships between universities and courts. 237 Interjurisdictional comparisons are rare, but very helpful when they do appear. 238
Mediation is perhaps the oldest and most widespread form of ADR used for
family challenges. In Ontario, free court-adjunct mediation is available in the 17 courthouses which are part of the Family Court Branch of the Superior Court of Justice (also
known as the “unified family court.”) 239 Mediation is also available at many of the other
family courts. Full or partial settlement is reached in 79 percent of Ontario family
mediations. 240 Mediation is usually less costly and more therapeutic than litigation, 241
and there is some evidence that resolutions reached using this dispute-resolution
technique are more durable than those which are the result of adjudication. 242 Jennifer
McIntosh and her colleagues compared found that including children in mediation
produced more durable agreements. 243 On the other hand, mediation may produce
unjust results in the many cases in which power imbalances and/or domestic violence
are factors. 244
From a cost-benefit point of view, the great advantage of mediation is that it can
produce durable settlements using a very small resource input. The parties need not
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have lawyers to participate in mediation. A successful mediation obviates the need for
future judicial intervention, thereby potentially saving public resources given that
mediators are much less costly to the taxpayer than judges are. These facts make
mediation a very compelling option in an environment of resource scarcity like that
which prevails in the Ontario family justice system. The provincial government
should ensure that free or affordable mediation is available to all Ontario family
litigants for appropriate cases.
Child assessment by mental health professional or social worker in a parenting
case can arguably be considered another form of ADR. This categorization is
questionable because the primary function of assessors is to identify and recommend
the parenting arrangement which would be in the best interests of a child or children . 245
This evaluative function is distinct from the dispute-resolution function which is at the
core of ADR. However, there is substantial evidence that neutral assessments generally
speed the parties to a negotiated resolution.
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Assessments sometimes produce

settlement incidentally, 247 and sometimes they do so because the assessor consciously
tries to achieve this result. The provincial government funds child assessments
conducted by social workers from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. 248 Although the
applicable statute defines these assessments as purely evaluative or forensic in nature,
there is compelling evidence that these social workers also encourage the parties to
settle by engaging in informal mediation. 249 These informal mediation efforts by the
OCL’s social workers in custody and access cases should be encouraged in appropriate
cases, because early settlement of the case is usually in the best interests of the child.
A new section should be added to the Children’s Law Reform Act which
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acknowledges and protects the mediative function of OCL social workers in
custody and access cases. 250
Collaborative family law (CFL) is a relatively new initiative, 251 which is quickly
gaining adherents in Ontario. 252 The distinguishing feature of collaborative family law is
the “Collaborative Practice Participation Agreement.” 253 This contract prevents the
lawyers involved from representing the parties if litigation occurs and which also
commits everyone involved to a cooperative and constructive approach to disputeresolution. CFL seems to consistently produce durable settlements while avoiding
litigation. However CFL is not itself without costs. Insofar as it requires the parties to
both retain lawyers as well as, often, other professionals, it is beyond the financial reach
of most Ontarians. Like mediation, it may lead to vulnerable parties settling for
markedly less than they might obtain at trial, 254 insofar as it de-emphasizes legal
entitlements in favour of interest-based negotiation. 255 While CFL is certainly a valuable
option for Ontarians who can afford it, it is not clear that the provincial government
should be involved in its provision.
Parenting coordination generally takes place after a parenting agreement or
order is in place between separated parents. 256 A parenting coordinator is generally
tasked with mediating and arbitrating smaller disputes about parenting between the
parties so as to avoid recourse to litigation, and with ensuring regular and conflict-free
access visits. 257 In some jurisdictions “special masters” are appointed by the court and
have similar functions. 258 In Ontario, however, parenting coordinators are usually
empowered by an agreement between the parties. Like CFL, parenting coordination is
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useful for those who can afford it, but it is not a realm in which the provincial
government has a direct role to play.
Arbitration is the form of ADR which is most similar to litigation. In arbitration, the
parties sign an “arbitration agreement” which empowers a third party to resolve their
dispute. Arbitration may or may not be preceded by a “mediation phase,” in which the
arbitrator seeks to mediate the dispute. If so, it is known as “mediation-arbitration,” or
“Med-Arb.” In Ontario the Arbitration Act governs arbitrations generally. 259 The Family
Arbitration regulation, among other things, requires that those who arbitrate family
disputes have certain types of training. This regulation also requires all family
arbitrations to be conducted in accordance with the law of Ontario or the law of another
Canadian jurisdiction. 260 Arbitration (with or without a prior mediation phase) offers the
parties finality, the ability to craft an appropriate procedure for each case, and an expert
decision-maker. 261 However arbitration’s confidentiality may inhibit the development of
the law, insofar as the decisions are not reported and cannot be used as precedents.
Private arbitration is not available to most Ontarians due to the paucity and high fees of
the specialist lawyers who provide this service. 262
Nonetheless, arbitration proponents say that it is actually less costly to the
litigants than courtroom litigation is, despite the fact that private arbitration requires the
parties to pay the arbitrator. 263 In a recent lecture, prominent Toronto arbitrator Lorne
Wolfson identified two key reasons for this cost advantage. 264 First, arbitrators are
experts in family law, and need not be “educated” by the parties’ lawyers. By contrast,
some judges are generalists, and if so the parties must pay their lawyers to prepare and
present submissions educating the judge about the applicable law. Second, Mr.
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Wolfson stated that arbitrators can dedicate large chunks of time to a single case – up
to a full day at a time. A judge, on the other hand, can often only allocate 1 hour at a
time to a case or settlement conference in a family law dispute. 265 Because one hour is
seldom sufficient, the parties must return weeks or months later. Their lawyers must
then be paid to learn the case and travel to court again.
If it is true that family arbitration is cheaper for the litigants than going to court,
this might point to substantial cost savings which might be achieved through family court
reform. If family judges were all specialists, and if they were allowed to allocate
longer continuous stretches of time to each case, then it is possible that the total
number of court room hours spent per case could be dramatically reduced. This
could, in turn, create substantial and immediate public savings. Ontario should
explore the possibility that features of the private family law arbitration system
might be imitated by the public court system.

IV. A. 4. Litigation
Litigation might be considered the “last line of defence” in Ontario’s response to
the challenges arising upon intimate relationship breakdown. Today, Ontario’s family
and general courts administer a system of statutes and common law rules which has
been totally re-written since the 1967 introduction of the Divorce Act. 266 All Ontario
family litigation is subject to a corpus of key statutes, 267 common law principles, and
procedural rules. 268 The Family Law Rules apply to all family disputes in all Ontario
courts. However, Ontario has a geographically heterogeneous family law procedure, in
which remain substantial differences between regions and courts. This section will
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briefly discuss some of the distinctive features of family litigation in Ontario, before
identifying some of the costs and benefits of litigation as a response to family disputes.
There are three types of court in the system: (i) the Superior Court of Justice, (ii)
the Ontario Court of Justice, and (iii) the Family Court branch of the Superior Court of
Justice. 269 Courts in this third category are also known as “Unified Family Courts”
(UFC). 270 In the 18 jurisdictions which have a UFC, all private family disputes can be
addressed therein. 271 In other parts of the province, litigants attend either the Superior
Court of Justice (SCJ) or the Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ). In general, parties who
are seeking a divorce must go to the SCJ while all others file in the OCJ. In remote
communities, family court may be part of a “court party” which travels between
communities. 272 Unified family courts reduce the complexity of the system for
litigants, while allowing resources such as mediation and specialist judges to be
deployed more efficiently for a larger group of litigants. The province should work
with the federal government to extend the UFC system across the province.
Another important difference between Ontario courts is the nature of the judges.
In some locations family matters are heard by specialist judges, who either deal
exclusively with family law disputes or who have family law among two or three areas of
exclusive focus. In others, the judges are generalists who hear the whole gamut of
legal disputes, including family law matters. In general, smaller communities are less
likely to have specialist family law judges, because the quantity of family disputes in
these areas is not sufficient to occupy a judge full-time. There is an active debate in the
literature about whether the quality of adjudication is correlated to whether or not the
judge is a family law specialist. 273 Many family lawyers prefer specialists, 274 but there
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does not appear to be quantifiable evidence about whether specialist judges produce
tangibly different results for litigants. The “Recapturing and Renewing” report proposed
what seems a reasonable compromise position between judicial generalism and judicial
specialism in family court: generalist judges should be appointed to hear family
cases for terms of at least six months. 275
There are a number of other points of divergence among Ontario family courts.
While some jurisdictions (including Toronto) appear to have enough judges to make a
system work in an orderly fashion, 276 other jurisdictions (particularly those in the “905”
area around Toronto) lack sufficient judicial resources to deal with the demand. 277
Judicial resources should be distributed so as to minimize regional disparities in
access to family justice. Parenting information sessions are mandatory in some
courts, voluntary in others, and entirely unavailable in many others. 278 There are also
reportedly some divergences among the forms used at different courts. 279 Conferences
under Rule 17 of the Family Law Rules are scheduled in different ways at different
courts. For example, in Brampton a judge will have three conferences scheduled
concurrently at 10 a.m., and shuttle between them. 280 In Toronto, one conference is
scheduled every hour or every two hours. 281
These are all examples of regional variations and experiments in family court
administration. They are evidence that litigation is not “monolithic” or totally traditionbound in the family arena. A simple form of cost-benefit analysis would involve
comparing the costs and benefits of these alternatives which are currently in place,
identifying best practices, and exploring potential to incorporate them elsewhere when
appropriate. While there may in some cases be good reasons for regional
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variation, family court judges and administrators should be encouraged to
identify best practices and spread them throughout the province where
appropriate.
What are the costs and benefits of litigation as a way to resolve family conflict, by
comparison to alternatives? While litigation is almost a dirty word among some family
conflict, professionals, its benefits should not be ignored. Both in Ontario and abroad,
the professionals who work in family courts have made substantial efforts to fine-tune
civil procedure to respond to the unique characteristics of family cases. 282 Litigation,
and facilitating access to the court, may have benefits in terms in terms of access to
justice, 283 perception of justice, 284 and respect for the court. 285 Sometimes the
adversarial system has produced breakthroughs. The 1992 Supreme Court of Canada
judgment in Moge v. Moge is generally acknowledged to have constituted a major leap
forward in Canadian spousal support law in terms of remedying support arrangements
which were unjust to women. 286 Moge, and the substantial social benefits which it has
produced, would have been impossible if the parties had been pushed into mandatory
mediation or another form of ADR. Had they weighed the amount of money at stake in
their case (less than $200 per month) against the cost of litigating through multiple
appeals to the highest court in the land, then it is unlikely that our law would have
moved forward as it did. 287
Some scholars say that people feel more satisfied with adversarial modes of
dispute resolution as compared to inquisitorial or mediatory ones. 288 Carol Smart and
Vanessa May note that, at least in principle, “the courts can … function as a mechanism
through which the parents can express their hurt and grievances, and in this way the
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legal process can offer psychological containment of disputes and conflict.” 289
However, family litigation appears to many of the litigants to be unfair. The OCLN
telephone survey found that, among low- and middle-income Ontarians who had
resolved a family dispute within the previous three years, 45.7% said the process was
“unfair.” 290 This suggests that the status quo, despite its emphasis on due process, is
not convincing Ontarians that justice is being done.
One genuine benefit of litigation as a dispute-resolution mechanism is its
openness to public scrutiny. Trials are transcribed, decisions are reported, and appeals
are available to the litigants. None of the forms of ADR described above possess all of
these characteristics. To the extent that we are concerned about decisions being made
on inappropriate grounds (e.g. gender bias), the openness of litigation may be
preferable to the secrecy of ADR.
Despite these benefits, family litigation imposes very substantial costs on adults,
children, and society. The most obvious costs of family litigation for adults are the time
and money which it consumes. The average 2009 legal fee for a contested divorce in
Ontario was $12,602. 291 A divorce may be “contested” even if it is settled fairly quickly,
and divorces involving courtroom advocacy can cost much more. The average legal fee
for all Ontario civil litigation cases culminating in two-day civil trials was $45,477. 292
While it is not clearly specified in this data source, it appears probable that these fees
are per person. The average “per family” legal fee for a contested divorce would
therefore be 2 x $12,602, or $25,204. Retaining other private sector professionals, such
as mediators or assessors adds to the cost, 293 unless doing so reduces the need for
lawyers.
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How affordable are family lawyers’ fees for Ontarians? These fees might be paid
for by borrowing, by drawing on savings, or from individual income. As noted above, 294
there is a long-term trend to higher levels of indebtedness and lower quantities of
savings. Even if an Ontarian is able to borrow or use savings in order to pay, doing so
will clearly have obvious long-term repercussions on his or her economic well-being.
Savings spent in litigation cannot be used for retirement or education, and loans must
eventually be repaid.
To what extent can the average Ontarian pay for family litigation using his or her
income, without drawing down savings or borrowing? The most recent data on
Ontarians’ incomes from Statistics Canada pertains to 2007. That data indicates that
the median income for “Economic families, two persons or more” in Ontario was
$67,500. 295 Projecting the 1998-2007 income growth trend forwards produces a
projected median income of $68,845 for 2009. 296 The 2009 “per family” legal fee for a
contested divorce ($25,204) is equal to 36.6% of this income. Given that the average
Canadian household saved only $3,200 in 2009, 297 it is clear that there is little surplus
available in the average household budget to pay sudden and dramatic expenses such
as legal fees.
It is safe to conclude that the average legal fee for a contested divorce would
constitute an enormous financial blow for the average family. Moreover, these costs
come at a time when people are likely to be especially ill-equipped to pay them, given
the other financial pressures which are likely to arise on relationship breakdown, such
as the need to relocate. This is particularly true for a spouse who left or curtailed
involvement in workforce during the relationship. 298
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Each family lawyer’s bill will likely be paid by a single individual, given that the
family relationship has broken down. Comparing the average legal bills against the
incomes of median “lone-parent families” and “unattached individuals” establishes the
inaccessibility of family legal services to middle-class Ontarians even more dramatically.
The average 2009 legal fee for a contested divorce in Ontario ($12,602) is equal to 58%
and 40% of the projected median 2009 incomes for unattached individuals and loneparent families, respectively.
Nor are the lawyers’ fees the only financial expense. The following finding is
from the Ontario Civil Legal Needs project, which conducted focus groups with justice
system workers:
In addition to actual legal costs, the focus group participants pointed out
a number of associated costs of accessing services that their clientele
were not generally aware of and therefore not prepared for. Among
these costs were those related to transportation, obtaining
documentation, trial costs outside of the lawyer’s services (such as
expert witness fees), and childcare costs (as childcare would sometimes
be needed to enable a client to attend hearings and trials). 299

Family litigation also has a very substantial cost in time. In some jurisdictions,
litigants must return to court many times before their matter is called, due to insufficient
judicial resources. In 2007 the Toronto Star told the story of Siddika Sumar, who spent
$256,963.13 in legal fees spent on her family law case between 2004 and 2007. On 11
occasions, she attended the Newmarket court with her lawyer, only to find that there
was no judge available or that the matter had been adjourned. 300 Newmarket is known
as a particularly overburdened family court, and this story is by no means representative
of all Ontarians’ experience. The particular problems faced by family courts in the “905
belt” around Toronto may help explain the OCLN telephone survey finding that residents
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of the “Outer GTA” [Greater Toronto Area] were among those whose family relationship
legal problems had persisted for the longest periods of time without resolution. 301 ”
However, even in the smoothest-running family courts, substantial time is
required to prepare and attend. For many, this means seeking time away from work,
arranging day care, etc. It has been estimated that the majority of all Ontario family
litigants are unrepresented by lawyers. 302 For these individuals the cost in money is
reduced but the cost in personal time and stress must surely be increased. An hour
which a citizen spends in, or preparing for, a family court appearance is an hour which
cannot be spent contributing to Ontario’s society or economy. For example, in the
access dispute Geremia v. Harb, the father was self-represented during the majority of
the litigation. 303 At the end, he claimed $155,688.53 in costs, arriving at this figure by
multiplying the hours he had spent on his case by a notional rate of $110 per hour. If
accurate, this would suggest that he spent in excess of 1400 hours preparing for this
case. Had he spent 1400 hours working as an electrician (his profession), the benefit to
Ontario in income taxes alone would have been substantial. While this claim was
probably extreme and was not allowed by the court, it provides some indication of the
cost in time of family litigation.
The costs of litigation are paid directly by adults, but they are also paid indirectly
by the children of these adults. Parenting requires time, money, and energy, and family
litigation can easily consume these scarce resources to the extent that it impairs
parenting. 304 Julie Lassonde conducted a round-table consultation with children who
had experienced challenges related to parental separation, and found substantial
awareness of the price of litigation and its impact on the family’s financial security. 305
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Occasionally, children are involved directly in family litigation. 306 There is a debate
about the impact of litigation-involvement on children, but at least in some cases it can
be traumatic. 307 This is especially true if children are asked to choose or take sides as
between their parents, and inexperienced judges or lawyers may do so. 308 Assessment
by a mental health professional or social worker is a much more common form of child
involvement in family litigation, 309 but some say that this too can be stressful for
children. 310 Children also pay a cost of family litigation because litigation increases
inter-parental hostility, 311 which has been clearly demonstrated in the literature to have
negative effects on children. 312
Family litigation also has substantial costs for society and the taxpayer. The most
obvious and direct costs to society of family litigation are those involved in paying
judges and other court personnel and in operating court rooms. Most judges of the
Ontario Court of Justice were paid a salary of $245,422.45 plus taxable benefits of
$3,659.35, for a total taxable remuneration of $249,081.80. 313 Remuneration of
Superior Court of Justice judges is established by the federal Judges Act, which
established a 2004 salary and a series of cost-of-living adjustments. 314 According to
the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission (established under s. 26(1) of the
Judges Act) the annual salary earned by these judges in 2009 was approximately
$260,064. 315
While some of these costs are inevitable, there is an argument to be made that
counterproductive processes increase these direct costs to the taxpayer. The costs of
dysfunctional family litigation borne by adults and children are also costs borne by
society as a whole. Social and economic benefits may therefore result from reform
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efforts which reduce dysfunctional conflict. Preventative efforts to reduce family
litigation are likely to save more money than they cost. Given its dramatic cost in
money, time, and stress, litigation should be society’s last resort in responding to
family conflict.

IV. B. Administrative and non-individualized responses to private support
entitlements
This section will survey the present reality and potential future application of
administrative solutions to family support obligations in Ontario. The adjective
“administrative” is used here to refer to the resolution of disputes and enforcement of
obligations by state agencies which are not courts, and by state employees who are not
judges. 316 This Part will first review the law of child support with emphasis on the
elements which may make it suitable for administrative solutions. It will then identify
administrative responses to family disputes which have already been implemented in
Ontario and elsewhere. The author will then argue that, at least with regard to guideline
child support, administrative solutions could have substantial benefits in increased
compliance and reduced process costs for parties and the state. The costs or
drawbacks of such reforms would come in the form reduced potential for discretionary
and customized judicial decision-making.

IV. B. 1. Guideline Child Support
The two primary support obligations in Canadian family law are child support and
spousal support. Spousal support has been made more predictable by the creation of
the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, 317 and could conceivably be subject to
administrative solutions. However child support, and especially “guideline” child
support, is the family law remedy which lends itself most obviously to administrative
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responses. “Guideline” child support is the amount payable according to section 3 of the
Child Support Guidelines (CSG). 318 The CSG require only two inputs in most cases: (i)
individual income of the payor, and (ii) the number of children for whom child support is
to be paid. Using these inputs, the amount owing is provided by a series of tables which
are part of the legislation.
Of course, Canadian child support law is more complex than simply the
calculation of Guideline amounts. In some cases, support must be calculated in a more
discretionary fashion – e.g. if custody is shared or if the payor’s income is in excess of
$150,000 per year. 319 Even if the Guideline amount is payable, additional amounts
may also be owed for “special expenses. 320 ” Determining the payor’s income can in
some cases be complex, especially if the payor is self-employed. 321 However in the
substantial majority of cases, once payor income and number of children are known
there is a readily calculated guideline amount which will be owing. There is, in these
cases, relatively little need for sophisticated or individualized decision-making about the
Guideline support obligation. It is for this reason that Ontario family court judges can
and do make guideline child support orders at pre-trial conferences, in the absence of
full argument and record. 322 It is also for this reason that guideline child support is an
area of our family law in which moving away from a judicial model towards an
administrative model should be considered.

IV. B. 2. Status quo in Ontario
In Ontario, the court system retains primary responsibility for determining support
obligations. However, some movement towards an administrative model has already
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taken place. This is most obviously true with regard to support enforcement, but is also
somewhat true with regard to determination and recalculation of support obligations.
The most prominent administrative element of family support procedure in
Ontario is the Family Responsibility Office (FRO). 323 A part of the provincial
government’s Ministry of Community and Social Services, FRO describes its work as
“help[ing] people meet their child and spousal support responsibilities.” 324 These
responsibilities include support obligations created by domestic contracts and paternity
agreements which have been filed with a court, 325 in addition to support orders made by
a judge. 326 FRO enforces support orders using powers assigned by the Family
Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act. 327 For example, FRO has the
power to suspend the driver’s license of a payor who is in default, 328 or seize his or her
property. 329 However FRO states that in most cases, the amount owing is simply
forwarded by the payor’s employer to FRO. 330 The agency then sends this money to
the support recipient.
A secondary administrative support enforcement initiative of the Ontario
government is www.goodparentspay.com. 331 Visitors to this website are invited to “help
Ontario children and families by helping us find missing, irresponsible parents who have
defaulted on the payments owed to their kids.” When accessed on June 21, 2010, this
website contained 39 photographs and physical description of support debtors. The
website asks members of the public to send information about these individuals and
their whereabouts to the Family Responsibility Office. The Family Responsibility Office
and Good Parents Pay are administrative approaches to support enforcement. The
Family Law Act also allows provincial agencies granting social assistance to enforce
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child support entitlements of recipients, 332 which could arguably be considered another
administrative approach to support enforcement.
Enforcement is only one element of the law of support. With regard to the initial
determination and recalculation of child support, the Ontario court system has remained
in the driver’s seat. However, this may be on the verge of changing. The following asyet-unproclaimed provisions were added to Ontario’s Family Law Act in late 2009:
Recalculation of child support
39.1 (1) The amount payable for the support of a child under an order
may be recalculated in accordance with this Act and the regulations
made under this Act, by the child support service established by the
regulations, in order to reflect updated income information.
Effect of recalculation
(2) Subject to any review or appeal process established by the
regulations made under this Act, if the child support service recalculates
an amount payable for the support of a child under an order, the
recalculated amount is, 31 days after the date on which the parties to
the order are notified of the recalculation in accordance with the
regulations, deemed to be the amount payable under the order. 333

These provisions appear to envision an administrative “child support service” which
could be responsible for recalculating child support in light of payor income changes.
However these remain unproclaimed as of June 21, 2010 and the regulations to which
they refer have not been made public.

IV. B. 3. Status Quo in Other Provinces
All of Canada’s provinces have Maintenance Enforcement Programs (MEPs)
analogous to Ontario’s FRO; these were created in the 1980s and 1990s. 334 The
essential functions of MEPs are (i) registration of cases; (ii) processing of payments; (iii)
monitoring, and (iv) enforcement. 335 Roughly one third of all Canadian family law cases
in which child support is owed are enrolled with a MEP. 336 In the West and North of
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Canada, the MEP programs are run on “opt-in” basis: the recipient can choose whether
to enrol. In the remainder of the country, they are generally “opt-out:” all support orders
are enrolled and recipients and payors can only remove themselves under specified
conditions. 337
While enforcement is the element of support law in which administrative solutions
are most widespread in Canada, recalculation is also the subject of several recent
administrative initiatives. As noted above, any change in payor income is likely to
constitute grounds for upward or downward revision. Because few people have
incomes which are totally constant from year to year, many payors and recipients are
legally entitled to seek a variation.
The Divorce Act permits the federal government to enter an agreement with a
province “authorizing a provincial child support service designated in the agreement to
… recalculate, at regular intervals, in accordance with the applicable guidelines, the
amount of child support orders on the basis of updated income information.” 338 Several
such provincial child support services have been established. According to a federal
Department of Justice survey conducted in March of 2008, they exist in Prince Edward
Island, Manitoba, British Columbia, and Newfoundland. 339 Another was subsequently
launched in Alberta, 340 and such programs may exist in other provinces as well.
Newfoundland was the first Canadian province to initiate an administrative child
support recalculation service under an agreement with Ottawa. This initiative began with
the “Family Justice Services Western” pilot project, which was established in the
communities of Corner Brook and Stephenville in 2002. It provided an expansive set of
services to individuals with family problems, including mediation, education, and
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counselling. 341 However, perhaps the most dramatic innovation was the administrative
child support recalculation service. An amendment to provincial legislation allowed
provincial employees to recalculate child support obligations after changes in payor
incomes, subject to only minimal judicial oversight. 342
A report prepared for the federal Department of Justice in 2004 evaluated this
pilot project. 343 This evaluation document sought to identify the costs, as well as the
benefits, of introducing such services on a broader basis. However, section 2.8 of the
report identified a divergence between the nominal budget of the pilot project
($489,460) and the “real cost,” due to the project’s reliance on in-kind contributions from
the provincial government and due to an unsustainably low salary for one of the
employees. 344 The document also identified some non-financial costs or drawbacks.
For example, it identified (without quantifying) the danger of court-annexed mediation in
situations of domestic violence or power imbalance. 345 However, the overall evaluation
was positive.
Administrative schemes do not yet appear to exist which handle the initial
determination of child support, as opposed to the subsequent recalculation or
enforcement of a support obligation. Section 25.1 of the Divorce Act suggests that
while provincial child support services may perform the entire function of recalculation
based on income changes by themselves, with regard to the initial determination of child
support entitlements they may only “assist courts.” 346 As of March of 2008, the
Department of Justice had not identified any administrative “Support Establishment
Services.” However, several provinces have special legal aid or mediation programs for
initial establishment of support. 347
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In Québec, the state has a somewhat more active role in child support collection
and enforcement. All child support payments are made to the Minister of Revenue
unless an exemption has been granted. 348 If the support debtor is in arrears, the
Minister may also in some cases provide advances of money to the support creditor.
These advances are limited to a maximum dollar amount of $1,000 and may not
continue for more than three months. 349 One impediment to implementing this system
in Ontario is that this province, unlike Québec, does not have its own Ministry of
Revenue. That task is performed on Ontario’s behalf by the Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA), and section IV.B.7 will consider a possible role for the CRA in family support
administration. Alternatively, FRO could perform a similar function, by providing a
steady stream of child support benefits to recipients in the event of fluctuations
in the amount collected. The amounts forwarded to recipients by FRO could
subsequently be collected from payors with interest.

IV. B. 4. Benefits of Administrative Solutions
Increased Compliance and Durability. With regard to child and spousal support
obligations, compliance is a substantial challenge, 350 and increased reliance on
administrative techniques may be part of the solution. In 1979, the Law Reform
Commission of Canada estimated that “some degree of default” occurs in “as many as
75 per cent of all orders" of this nature. 351 There is also some information about
compliance available from provincial Maintenance Enforcement Programs such as
FRO. In one sample of MEPs studied by Statistics Canada, only one third of the
recipients enrolled received the full amount owing in every month of a given year. 352
Another Statistics Canada document reported that roughly 68% of cases enrolled in a
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MEP are in full compliance in any given month. 353 Ontario’s Provincial Auditor reported
in 2005 that “payment arrears totalled approximately $1.3 billion,” and “approximately
23,000 support recipients, whose cases were in arrears totalling over $200 million in
2003, were receiving provincial social assistance.” 354
However, many support agreements are not registered with a MEP, and it is
difficult or impossible to determine the compliance rate among these. A substantial
methodological problem is posed by the large number of cases which are never subject
to any formal adjudication. If two parents separate and reach a “kitchen table”
agreement about child support without involving the legal system, how is a researcher
to know whether those child support obligations were fulfilled?
Paul Millar responded to this challenge with an innovative empirical technique in
his 2009 book. 355 Millar used the Statistics Canada Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics data set in order to study support payments in Canada. 356 This survey asked
respondents questions about how much they paid and/or received in child and spousal
support every month, as part of a general questionnaire about income. 357 Child support
is directly tied to the payor’s income in most cases, and while spousal support is more
complex it is also correlated to payor income. One would therefore expect that support
payments would change roughly as often as payor incomes do. However Millar found
that income fluctuates much more often and more dramatically than support payments.
Millar elaborates on his findings:
The fraction of household income, particularly for support payors, is
much lower than would be expected awards dictated by the Canadian
child support guidelines. The finding supports the contention that child
support is drifting away – on average, lower – from the guidelines as
time passes, accounting for the lower than expected amounts of child
support as proportion of payors’ income. 358
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A key benefit of administrative initiatives in family support law is their potential to
increase compliance. Indeed, this is the primary purpose of the maintenance
enforcement programs schemes which represent the most substantial administrative
initiatives in Canadian family law. 359 The deduction of support at source (e.g. by the
employer of the support obligor) removes many of the opportunities for non-payment.
The expansion of administrative initiatives, for example into the initial establishment and
subsequent recalculation of support obligations, might further increase the number of
parents who receive the amounts to which they are entitled by law. It could also bring
relief for the payors who have suffered involuntary decreases in income and are
therefore entitled to reductions in the obligation. For these among other reasons, Paul
Millar suggests that an administrative agencies should perhaps play a stronger role in
child support recalculation. 360
Reduced Process Costs for the Parties. Using litigation to determine and enforce
guideline child support involves substantial process costs for the parties. 361 Parents,
especially single parents, are already under substantial time and financial stress.
Having to go to court may therefore be especially burdensome for them. Administrative
initiatives have the potential to reduce the process costs on parents who receive or pay
child support. Shelley Kierstead describes administration recalculation schemes as the
“ideal manner by which to foster greater certainty and relieve recipient parents of the
potentially daunting burden of initiating negotiations for revised support obligations with
a former partner.” 362 The benefits which Kierstead identifies would also be enjoyed by
payors who experience involuntary drops in income. 363
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IV. B. 5. Costs and Drawbacks of Administrative Solutions
Lack of individualized legal advice and help. The first significant drawback is that
administrative regimes are not likely to offer parties the individualized advice and
support which a capable lawyer can provide. This reality is illustrated by the Family
Responsibility Office’s treatment of “Mr. F,” which was the subject of a 2006 report from
the Ombudsman of Ontario, André Marin. 364 FRO had issued a Writ of Seizure and
Sale against a home belonging to F’s former spouse. However, the Writ was issued in
the debtor’s former name, instead of her new married name. Because the home was
registered under the debtor’s new name, the Writ was ineffectual. The Ombudsman
chastised FRO for not informing Mr. F of the potential need to vary the support order so
as to reflect the debtor’s new name. 365 The Director of FRO replied that this office,
as a neutral maintenance enforcement program enforcing support
orders in Ontario, is unable to provide legal advice to either a support
payor or a support recipient. 366

While the Ombudsman found this explanation unconvincing, 367 there are good reasons
why administrative agencies must be cautious about giving legal advice to individuals.
To do so can expose them to liability insofar as they lack the resources and statutory
mandate to competently offer legal advice. The reality is that parties are unlikely to
receive compassionate and individualized service from an administrative agency such
as FRO or the Canada Revenue Agency. This is not necessary the consequence of
incompetence or wrong-doing on the part of the agency; it is simply a reflection of the
nature of government agencies. Personalized and emotionally responsive service is
more likely to come from a lawyer or paralegal who is directly retained by the client.
The Disempowering Effects of Bureaucracy. Second, working with an
administrative agency may also be more disempowering than working with an individual
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legal service provider. Lawyers are, at least in principle, responsible to and directed by
their clients. By contrast, Marin characterized the relationship between Mr. F and the
FRO as “one of power and dependency,” with the agency in the driver’s seat. Marin
noted that s. 6(7) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act
(the statute which empowers FRO) prevents the parties themselves from initiating
enforcement actions once the order has been filed with FRO. He therefore concluded
that FRO “has the legal duty to enforce support arrangements, the discretion to use a
range of tools to do so, and imposing powers. Meanwhile, the ‘support recipients’ …
have their enforcement rights and interests left entirely in the hands of that Office.” 368
Inefficiency and Ineffectiveness of Administrative Agencies. Third, it should not
be assumed that an administrative agency will discharge its assigned functions in an
efficient and effective manner, even when those functions appear to be straightforward
and the agency’s powers appear to be plenary. As the status quo compliance figures
indicate, the provinces’ Maintenance Enforcement Programs described above are by no
means completely successful in securing support payment. 369 The Provincial Auditor of
Ontario sharply criticized FRO in 2003 for its lack of effectiveness:
We concluded that the Family Responsibility Office did not have
satisfactory systems and procedures in place for initiating contact and
taking appropriate and timely enforcement action where payers were in
arrears on their family-support obligations. In fact, it is our view that,
unless the Office takes aggressive enforcement action, supported by
effective case management and significantly improved information
technology and communications systems, it is in grave danger of failing
to meet its mandated responsibilities. We found that the Office’s
services were impaired… 370

A 2005 follow-up by the same office found that “some progress has been made
in implementing the recommendations, but “further progress on several
recommendations depends on the successful implementation of a new case
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management system." 371 While there are tens of thousands of Ontarians in arrears on
child support, Good Parents Pay has only 39 profiles publicly available. Clearly,
whatever impact this administrative initiative has can only be a “drop in the bucket.”
Other potential costs or drawbacks of administrative initiatives should also be
recognized. Removing an area of the law from the domain of the courts may diminish
the ability of the common law to develop along with society. 372 Especially in the
absence of effective judicial review, administrative agencies may abrogate the rights of
citizens in an irresponsible or authoritarian fashion.
Finally, family courts can offer “one-stop-shopping” to Ontarians. Property
division and parenting disputes may be resolved along with support issues in a single
process. If those family disputes which are most amenable to administrative decisionmaking (i.e., guideline child support) were to be handled by a separate agency,
Ontarians might have to engage in two or more separate processes to resolve their
family challenges. This duplication of processes would entail substantial additional
process costs. As Ontario explores the potential of administrative responses to
family challenges, it should seek to maximize their benefits (increased
compliance and potentially reduced process costs), while reducing their costs
(such as citizen disempowerment, bureaucratic inefficiency).

IV. B. 6. The potential role of the Canada Revenue Agency
Among the numerous ways in which administrative decision-making in family law
could be expanded, one of the more dramatic and comprehensive would be involving
the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in child support determination, recalculation,
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collection and payment. In Quebec, the Minister of Revenue is actively involved in child
support collection and payment, and this model could be expanded across the country.
There are several potential advantages to this idea. As noted above,
determining the income of self-employed individuals is one of the thorniest challenges in
child support law. The CRA is already in the business of precisely determining individual
income, in order to assess income tax owing. There might be significant efficiencies in
allocating the task of income-determination for child support purposes to the CRA as
well.

With regard to enforcement, the CRA also has the legal powers and the expertise

to collect income tax which is in arrears. These powers might equally be used to collect
child support. Finally, the CRA already has some involvement in family disputes, e.g.
under the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act. 373
However, giving responsibility for child support to the CRA would certainly
involve that agency in matters with which it has no experience or institutional expertise.
For example, the determination of biological parentage involves genetic testing of
individuals and the application of legal presumptions. There are also discretionary
elements of child support which call for individualized decision-making. 374 Finally, there
are constitutional and political impediments to having the CRA involved in child support,
which might or might not be overcome. 375 The province should explore and discuss
with the federal government the potential of involving the CRA in family support
administration.

V. CONCLUSION
In applying cost-benefit analysis to post-relationship family challenges, this paper
has asked three questions which are perhaps more familiar in public health than in legal
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discourse. First, why does the unhealthy condition in question arise? Second, how can
the condition, or its worst symptoms, be prevented before they arise? Third, given that
prevention will not be fully successful, how should we respond to or treat the problem
when and to the extent that it arises within the population?
Each potential response to family challenges has its own constellation of costs
and benefits. Only some of these costs and benefits are capable of quantification and
comparison. This paper has sought to identify reforms which seem to have benefits in
excess of their costs. Harmonious with the findings of the Law Commission’s public
consultations, many of these proposals involve moving the point of public intervention
earlier in the lifespan of the family, or earlier in the lifespan of the conflict. The Law
Commission may conclude that, in Ontario’s response to post-separation family
challenges, an ounce of prevention is indeed worth a pound of cure.
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